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THE NEW SISTER-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
Michael H. Hoffheimer* 
Abstract: The Article reviews the constitutional status of sister-state sovereign immunity. 
It argues that the parity requirement announced in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt (2016) is a 
temporary compromise that is supported by neither the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause nor by cases cited by the Court. It further argues that parity is bad policy because parity 
overprotects states for acts they commit beyond their borders and under protects the interests 
of forum states in regulating conduct within their territorial jurisdiction. 
But the Article breaks from most scholarship. It suggests that the Court went too far in 
Nevada v. Hall (1979) in finding that nothing in the Constitution compels states to respect 
sister-state claims to sovereign immunity. But it does not endorse those critics who find 
absolute state immunity in policies of federalism. Instead it proposes a limited constitutional 
basis for sister-state immunity that grounds this immunity in territorial restrictions on judicial 
power that operated during the founding era. Under the proposed approach, states would enjoy 
sovereign immunity in a sister-state court—but only for acts they or their agents commit in 
their own territory. The Article explains how this limited immunity accommodates the 
competing interests of the states, and why it is superior to alternative proposals to ground sister-
state immunity in international law. 
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And what trouble will I get into with precedents in the 




The Eleventh Amendment purported to end private litigation against 
states in federal courts,2 and courts and commentators long assumed that 
                                                     
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1277 
(2016) (No. 14-1175) [hereinafter Hyatt II Transcript] (colloquy with counsel during which Justice 
Breyer requested but did not receive legal authority for position ultimately adopted by Court). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). The Eleventh Amendment 
has been expanded beyond its words. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322–30 (1934) 
(holding state may not be sued by foreign nation in federal court); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 
(1890) (holding Eleventh Amendment bars citizen from suing citizen’s own state in federal court 
despite presence of federal question). Courts have recognized numerous exceptions to the prohibition. 
See generally Martha Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part 
One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977). Scholars have argued that the Court’s reliance on state sovereign 
immunity to explain its holdings is anachronistic, incoherent, or in conflict with other constitutional 
06 - Hoffheimer.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  8:49 AM 
2017] THE NEW SISTER-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1773 
 
a state could not be sued in other state courts without its consent.3 But in 
1979 a divided Supreme Court held in Nevada v. Hall4 that the long 
tradition of sovereign immunity among states was not mandated by any 
provision of the federal Constitution: sister-state immunity was purely a 
matter of comity to be found in state law, and states were free to reject 
sister states’ defenses of sovereign immunity.5 
In June 2015, the Court granted certiorari in Franchise Tax Board v. 
Hyatt [hereinafter Hyatt II]6 to consider whether to overrule Hall. Forty-
five states urged the Court to do so.7 Reduced to eight members with the 
death of Justice Scalia in February 2016, the Court divided equally on the 
core constitutional issue, leaving the precedent standing—for the time 
being.8 But Hyatt II also announced a new rule of parity that decided the 
case on the facts before the Court. The Court held that full faith and credit 
has a special application in the area of interstate immunity and requires a 
state court to accord to other states at least as much sovereign immunity 
as it extends to the state in which it sits.9 
                                                     
commitments. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1201 (2001); Field, supra; William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 843 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953 
(2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of 
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Davis L. Shapiro, Comment, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh 
Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984). But see Alfred Hill, In Defense of 
Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485 (2001) (criticizing critics of Court’s sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence). 
3. E.g., Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883) (“It may be accepted 
as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a state nor the United States can be sued as a 
defendant in any court in this country without their consent, except in the limited class of cases in 
which a state may be made a party in the supreme court of the United States by virtue of the original 
jurisdiction conferred on this court by the constitution.”). The conservative scholarship responding to 
the Hall decision is especially valuable for collecting compelling evidence of the widespread 
acceptance of the assumption of sister-state immunity. E.g., Philip L. Martin, The New Interpretation 
of Sovereign Immunity for the States, 16 CAL. W. L. REV. 39 (1980). 
4. 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
5. Id. at 420–21. 
6. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2940 (2015) (mem.) (granting certiorari 
for two questions). See infra text at note 115 (identifying issues on review). 
7. Hyatt II Transcript, supra note 1, at 9 (clarifying number of states opposing Hall). 
8. Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court observed only that the Court was equally divided, without 
indicating which members of the Court favored overruling Hall. See generally Justin Pidot, Tie Votes 
in the Supreme Court, 101 MINN. L. REV. 245, 297 (2017) (discussing tie vote in Hyatt II and other 
cases decided same term). 
9. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83 (2016) [hereinafter Hyatt II]. 
This part of the Court’s decision was supported by five members of the Court with three Justices 
dissenting. See infra section III.B. The first state court to cite the opinion summarized its holding 
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This Article examines the current constitutional status of sister-state 
immunity.10 It argues that Hyatt II’s parity requirement is a temporary 
expedient, inconsistent with full faith and credit principles and lacking a 
secure foundation in the case law. At the same time, it questions Hall’s 
rejection of all constitutional limits on sister-state immunity and identifies 
a constitutional source for immunity in territorial restrictions on state 
power that were understood as attributes of sovereignty during the 
founding era and that persisted into the twentieth century. It proposes that 
states should be immune under their own law but only for acts and 
consequences of their acts within their own territory. And it contends that 
this territorial approach strikes the right constitutional balance between 
the interests of sovereign actors in limiting their liability and the interests 
of other states in exercising regulatory control over events in their 
territories. 
Part II shows how Hall’s broad rejection of constitutional limits on 
sister-state immunity was not required by the facts of that case and 
departed sharply from the reasoning offered by the state court. Part III 
discusses the Court’s failure in Hyatt II to reach agreement on the 
constitutional status of sister-state sovereign immunity, examines the new 
rule of parity adopted by the majority, and considers objections raised by 
dissenting members of the Court. 
Part IV critically evaluates the new parity requirement for sister-state 
sovereign immunity. It exposes the lack of foundation for the requirement 
in prior cases construing the Full Faith and Credit Clause, explores the 
uncertain scope of the requirement, and argues that parity insufficiently 
accommodates the competing interests of state sovereigns. While the new 
rule curtails potential interference with sister-state sovereignty, this Part 
argues that it does so by an unwarranted sacrifice of the forum state’s 
legitimate regulatory policies. 
Part V considers alternative approaches to sister-state immunity. First, 
it finds support for sister-state sovereign immunity in structural 
limitations on the reach of state process that were closely identified with 
attributes of sovereignty during the founding era. While such limitations 
                                                     
similarly. Montaño v. Frezza, 393 P.3d 700, 705 (N.M. 2017) (extending immunity to sister state as 
matter of comity but observing that “the Full Faith and Credit Clause . . . requires us to recognize the 
sovereign immunity of other states to the extent that sovereign immunity has been retained by this 
state under our law”) (citing Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1282–83). 
10. It does not separately address the preliminary, related issue of personal jurisdiction of one state 
court over another state as a party. The Court has often adopted language that conflates the issue of 
juridical jurisdiction and the issue of the substantive defenses. Cf. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1279 (“In 
Nevada v. Hall . . . this court held that one State . . . can open the doors of its courts to a private 
citizen’s lawsuit against another State . . . without the other State’s consent.”). 
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effectively shielded states from liability in sister-state courts for over a 
century, they provide no authority for limiting state liability arising from 
the sovereign’s conduct outside its own territorial jurisdiction. Second, it 
considers a proposal by Judge John M. Rogers for grounding sister-state 
sovereign immunity in the evolving norms of international law.11 Finally, 
it considers the practical effect of the proposed approach. Under the 
approach proposed in this Article, California would be free to impose 
liability in a case like Hall where agents of Nevada enter California and 
cause personal injuries in California. But Nevada would be compelled to 
respect California’s sovereign immunity in a case like Hyatt for claims 
based on tortious conduct by California agents in California. In contrast, 
Nevada would be free to reject sovereign immunity and impose liability 
for claims based on California agents’ intentional torts in Nevada. 
This Article does not address whether sister-state immunity is 
politically desirable. It concludes only that the parity requirement has 
weak constitutional foundations and is unnecessary to preserve interstate 
harmony. States would remain free to accord greater deference to other 
states’ immunities either by judicial comity12 or by some form of mutual 
agreement. If a problem exists and requires a federal solution, Congress 
has authority to act.13 
I. THE CONTESTED AUTHORITY: NEVADA V. HALL 
A. Facts 
In May 1968, an employee of the state of Nevada was driving a car 
owned by the state university, an instrumentality of Nevada, within the 
state of California.14 While acting in the scope of his duties, the Nevada 
driver collided with another car, causing personal injuries, including 
severe disabling brain damage, to the passengers of the other car who were 
                                                     
11. John M. Rogers, Applying the International Law of Sovereign Immunity to the States of the 
Union, 1981 DUKE L.J. 449. Judge Rogers published the article while still a law professor prior to his 
call to the federal bench. 
12. Some states have accorded full deference to sister-state defenses of sovereign immunity as a 
matter of comity. E.g., Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 544 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ill. 1983) (respecting 
sister state’s sovereign immunity defense on grounds of comity). Others have imposed significant 
restrictions on actions against sister states that are not available in other cases. See infra note 102 
(discussing California court’s decision not to award punitive damages against sister state absent 
express legislative direction). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate commerce . . . among 
the several States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Congress may by general laws prescribe the 
manner in which such [state] acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”).  
14. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979). 
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residents of California. The Nevada driver died in the collision.15 The 
California residents commenced an action in California state court against 
the state of Nevada, the University of Nevada, and the administrator of 
the deceased driver.16 
B. The Road Not Taken: The Supreme Court of California’s Approach 
While the case proceeded against the estate of the driver,17 the State of 
Nevada moved to quash service on the ground that California state courts 
lacked jurisdiction over claims against sister states.18 The trial court 
granted the motion, but the California Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that Nevada was subject to personal jurisdiction. 
Justice Peters, writing for a unanimous court, provided a narrow ground 
for the decision: “sister states who engage in activities within California 
are subject to our laws with respect to those activities and are subject to 
suit in California courts with respect to those activities.”19 Without 
rejecting all claims to sovereign immunity, Justice Peters linked both 
amenability to suit (personal jurisdiction) and liability to the state’s 
activities within another state: 
When the sister state enters into activities in this state, it is not 
exercising sovereign power over the citizens of this state and is 
not entitled to the benefits of the sovereign immunity doctrine as 
to those activities unless his state has conferred immunity by law 
or as a matter of comity.20 
The Supreme Court of California did not begin its analysis by assuming 
that its sister state, Nevada, was not entitled to immunity. On the contrary, 
it concluded that immunity was unavailable only because the volitional 
activity of the state of Nevada created a relationship with California that 
eliminated the defense. For this reason, it looked to federal cases where 
federal courts held that states waived sovereign immunity defenses by 
                                                     
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. The California Supreme Court observed that the case was “[a]pparently” proceeding to trial 
against the administrator of the estate of the driver. Hall v. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d 1363, 1365 n.3 
(Cal. 1972). It is not known why the driver’s estate did not raise a defense of immunity, and the 
outcome of that litigation is not reported. 
18. Id. at 1364. 
19. Id. The opinion was one of the justice’s last, published December 21, two weeks before his 
death. Justice Raymond E. Peters of the California High Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1973), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/04/archives/justice-raymond-e-peters-of-the-california-high-
court.html [https://perma.cc/UU89-3ZYE]. 
20. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d at 1364. 
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engaging in interstate commercial activity that was expressly regulated by 
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.21 The general rule in such cases was 
one of sovereign immunity, but “the state[,] by engaging in interstate 
commerce by rail and thereby subjecting itself to the federal legislation[,] 
must be deemed to have waived any right it may have had arising out of 
the general rule that a sovereign state may not be sued without its 
consent.”22 
Justice Peters did not suggest that Nevada was subject to California 
laws because it had engaged in interstate commerce. He suggested rather 
that just as a state lost sovereign immunity and became subject to federal 
authority when it engaged in activity directly regulated by Congress, so 
the sister state lost sovereign immunity when its agents physically entered 
California and engaged in in-state activity that was directly regulated by 
state law.23 Although the analogous federal authority was later overruled, 
Justice Peters’s position remains sound under principles that govern 
sovereigns in international relations.24 
Justice Peters found even more direct authority in state decisions 
holding that sister states owning property in other states were subject to 
the laws of the states where the property was located.25 From these cases, 
the Court proposed a general territorial limit: “[a]lthough these cases 
involve enforcement of property duties rather than in personam 
jurisdiction and a transitory action, they reflect that state sovereignty ends 
at the state boundary.”26 
Justice Peters did not rest his rejection of sovereign immunity on 
comity. Only after determining that the sister state’s activity lay outside 
the zone covered by sovereign immunity did Justice Peters consider 
comity-based arguments in favor of sovereign immunity. First, he 
                                                     
21. Id. (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 190 (1964), 
overruled by Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676–
80 (1999) (expressly overruling Parden and rejecting its theory of constructive waiver of sovereign 
immunity)). 
22. Id. (citing Maurice v. California, 110 P.2d 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941)). 
23. Id. 
24. Martiniak characterizes the California court’s approach as a “less restrictive” version of the 
restrictive approach to foreign sovereign immunity “where the only ‘restriction’ is that the suit arise 
from acts occurring ‘within’ the forum state.” Chris Martiniak, Hall v. Nevada: State Court 
Jurisdiction Over Sister States v. American State Sovereign Immunity, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1144, 1160 
(1975). 
25. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d at 1365 (citing and quoting People v. Streeper, 145 N.E.2d 635, 629–
30 (Ill. 1957) (injunction against sister state stemming from property owned in state); State v. 
Holcomb, 116 P. 251, 254 (Kan. 1911) (taxation of sister state based on property owned in state)). 
26. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d at 1365 (emphasis added). 
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distinguished the only case on point.27 Second, he rejected “possible 
embarrassment” as a ground for prohibiting claims against sister states 
when those claims advanced important policies.28 He found such 
important policies in the nonresident motorist statute that required 
nonresidents to answer lawsuits in the state for conduct in the state.29 
In addition to the public safety promoted by the nonresident motorist 
provision, Justice Peters identified two general policy interests that 
militated against a comity-based recognition of Nevada’s sovereign 
immunity. First, he identified an interest in providing California residents 
and taxpayers with a forum where they may seek redress. And second, he 
found an interest in assuming jurisdiction where most of the evidence is 
in California and where abdication of authority may result in litigation in 
other states.30 
Two other considerations counseled against comity. It would be unfair 
to deny a California plaintiff a claim against a sister state that retained 
sovereign immunity under circumstances where recovery would be 
permitted against the state of California.31 And the Court viewed the 
defense of sovereign immunity as “suspect” or disfavored “in a society 
such as ours, which places such great value on the dignity of the individual 
and views the government as an instrument to secure individual 
rights . . . .”32 
C. The Categorical Rejection of Constitutional Obligations to Respect 
Sister-State Immunities 
On remand, the California trial court denied the state of Nevada’s 
motion to limit liability to $25,000, the maximum authorized under 
                                                     
27. Id. (distinguishing Paulus v. South Dakota, 201 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1924), on the ground that in 
Paulus the North Dakota Court relied on the fact that the plaintiff was a resident of the state that he 
sought to sue in another state). Justice Blackmun would later criticize the California Supreme Court 
for failing to recognize that in subsequent litigation the plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that 
he was a resident of North Dakota, and the North Dakota Supreme Court persisted in holding that the 
claim was barred by sovereign immunity. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 430 (1979) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Paulus v. South Dakota, 227 N.W. 52 (N.D. 1929)). 
28. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d at 1365 (quoting Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (identifying 
the important state interest promoted by nonresident motorist statute)). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 1365–66 (“The presence of the evidence and witnesses in California could, of course, 
mean that plaintiffs if not permitted to proceed in California could find themselves seriously hampered 
in proving their case elsewhere.”). 
31. Id. at 1366. 
32. Id. 
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Nevada’s partial waiver of sovereign immunity.33 The jury found liability 
and returned a verdict for damages in the amount of $1,150,000.34 After 
the Court of Appeals affirmed,35 and the state Supreme Court denied 
review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. As Justice Stevens 
wrote, “[d]espite its importance, the question whether a State may claim 
immunity from suit in the courts of another State has never been addressed 
by this Court.”36 
Justice Stevens’s opinion embraced an instrumental approach to 
judicial decision-making that informed the interest analysis approach to 
conflict of laws.37 He assumed from the outset that forum state courts, as 
instruments of a sovereign power, have broad judicial authority, and he 
regarded most legal limits on such power as themselves originating in the 
law of the forum. These methodological assumptions led him to 
distinguish between a sovereign’s immunity in its own court system, and 
sovereign immunity accorded to other states as parties in other sovereign’s 
courts. This approach skewed towards finding that legal obligation to 
recognize a defense under another state’s law was self-imposed as a matter 
of “comity.”38 Despite its long tradition, comity itself was left largely 
undefined—connoting a vague charitable commitment to some respect for 
other sovereigns or some shared goal of interstate harmony. 
From this orientation, Justice Stevens made quick work of the claims 
for a constitutional obligation outside of state law to respect sister-state 
immunity. As a functional limit on the power of sovereign forums, he 
insisted that such an obligation be expressly rooted in some specific 
                                                     
33. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 412. (1979). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 413–14. 
36. Id. at 414. 
37. Justice Stevens did not cite Currie’s scholarship, but Currie’s theory of conflict of laws was 
highly influential by the 1970s. Currie drew on a long tradition that viewed choice of law as a matter 
of forum-state deference; he justified a forum’s occasional application of some other jurisdiction’s 
rule of decision only when it advanced some forum interest—or when it conflicted with no forum 
interest. See BRAINHERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177–87 (1963).  
38. Sovereign immunity within a single sovereign was a result of functional limits of the 
sovereign’s own courts to hold the source of their authority accountable. In contrast, the claim of 
immunity raised in another state’s courts “necessarily implicates the power and authority of a second 
sovereign; its source must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, between the two 
sovereigns, or in the voluntary decision of the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of 
comity.” Hall, 440 U.S. at 416. 
Justice Stevens illustrated this in the Court’s holding in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), where the Court recognized a sovereign immunity defense regarding a 
vessel attached in admiralty but did so by reasoning that the forum states voluntarily ceded exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction over visiting sovereigns as a matter of comity. Hall, 440 U.S. at 416–17. 
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provision of the Constitution, and he found no such obligation in the 
Eleventh Amendment,39 the Full Faith and Credit Clause,40 or in other 
implied limits.41 For him claims based on any implied limits to preserve 
the autonomy of sister states were particularly unpersuasive because they 
in turn entailed restrictions on the power of the forum state—in conflict 
with his methodological assumption.42 
This left only the long history of widely shared assumptions that states 
did in fact enjoy sovereign immunity in sister-state courts.43 Justice 
Stevens fully acknowledged evidence of “the widespread acceptance of 
the view that a sovereign State is never amenable to suit without its 
consent,”44 but nothing in the historical record convinced him that the 
source was derived from the Constitution rather than from the local laws 
of the states. For Justice Stevens, the pervasive acceptance of sovereign 
immunity as a matter of international and domestic law explained why it 
was not incorporated as a limit in the Constitution.45 Like all states, 
                                                     
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.”). The Eleventh Amendment 
withdrew a contested grant of subject matter jurisdiction in Article III that Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), construed to authorize citizens of one state to sue another state in federal 
court.  
40. The Court relied on authority that established that the Clause “does not require a State to apply 
another State’s law in violation of its own legitimate public policy.” Hall, 440 U.S. at 422 (citing Pac. 
Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)). The Court found strong California policies 
in providing full protection for persons injured on its highways. Id. at 424. It found that exercising 
jurisdiction over nonresident motorists effectuated this policy, and it observed that to further 
implement the policy, California waived its own sovereign immunity. Id. 
41. Nevada argued that specific limits on state power in the Constitution demonstrated a 
commitment to restricting the power of states to disregard the sovereign immunity defenses of sister 
states. While agreeing that numerous provisions place limitations on state sovereignty, Justice Stevens 
refused to find an implied obligation to respect sister-state immunity. Id. at 425 (“[T]hese provisions 
do not imply that any one State’s immunity from suit in the courts of another State is anything other 
than a matter of comity.”). 
42. As he insisted, the Tenth Amendment provided no answer. Id. (“[T]he the existence of express 
limitations on state sovereignty may equally imply that caution should be exercised before concluding 
that unstated limitations on state power were intended by the Framers.”). 
43. In his critique of the California Supreme Court decision, Martiniak anticipated arguments that 
the Constitution “implicitly assumes the notion of interstate sovereign immunity as a premise integral 
to the whole federal scheme.” Martiniak, supra note 24, at 1152 (comparing implied immunity to the 
implied right to the right to travel and discussing Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 77 (Ct. Com. Pl. 
Pa., Phila. Cty. 1781)); see also id. at 1154, 1164 (articulating arguments that the Constitution requires 
respect for sister-state sovereign immunity). Though he argued that the California court “failed to 
examine adequately the questions of federalism raised by Hall,” he did not conclude that sister-state 
immunity was constitutionally mandated. Id. 
44. Hall, 440 U.S. at 420–21 n.20 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1934); 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)). 
45. “Regardless of whether the Framers were correct in assuming, as presumably they did, that 
06 - Hoffheimer.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  8:49 AM 
2017] THE NEW SISTER-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1781 
 
California would no doubt have allowed the defense in the past, but in 
rejecting the defense, California altered its treatment of comity, and 
because nothing prohibited it from doing so, the Supreme Court affirmed. 
D. A Guilty Conscience: Footnote 24 
Justice Stevens relied on California’s “substantial” local policies as 
providing a permissible ground for applying California law and 
disregarding Nevada’s sovereign immunity.46 But he added a footnote that 
indicated some awareness that the Court’s broad ruling might cause 
mischief in other cases. In the note he observed that California’s disregard 
of Nevada’s sovereign immunity defense posed “no substantial threat to 
our constitutional system of cooperative federalism.”47 He emphasized 
that the factual circumstances supporting the claim made the appeal to 
sovereign immunity less convincing: “[s]uits involving traffic accidents 
occurring outside of Nevada could hardly interfere with Nevada’s 
capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities.”48 And he suggested 
                                                     
prevailing notions of comity would provide adequate protection against the unlikely prospect of an 
attempt by the courts of one State to assert jurisdiction over another, the need for constitutional 
protection against that contingency was not discussed.” Id. at 419. 
The emphasis on comity led Justice Stevens to ignore other features of the legal system that prevent 
sister-state encroachment on sovereign immunity. States would probably not have feared a disregard 
of defenses in sister-state courts, because they probably could not have conceived of any way that 
they would be forced to litigate in such courts. The territorial assumptions about personal jurisdiction 
later articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), reflected the reality that states (even if 
endowed with the legal attributes that made them subject to suit) would not be amenable to process 
in sister-state courts. 
The history of procedure rather than the substantive law of defenses explains why all cases raising 
issues of sovereign immunity were proceedings in rem where one state owned property in a sister 
state. Although Justice Stevens did not discuss most of the cases, Justice Peters considered them. Hall 
v. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Cal. 1972) (discussing cases). The sole case considered by the 
California Supreme Court as precedent was Paulus v. South Dakota, 227 N.W. 52 (N.D. 1929). Id. 
Paulus involved a claim for damages, which the North Dakota Supreme Court characterized as “not 
an action strictly in rem.” Paulus v. South Dakota, 201 N.W. 867, 870 (N.D. 1924). In fact, the claim 
arose from an explosion at a mine owned and operated by a sister state in North Dakota, and the 
plaintiff commenced the action in rem by means of a writ of attachment. Id. at 867. 
46. Hall, 440 U.S. at 424 n.24. 
47. Id. Justice Stevens in other opinions had advocated an idiosyncratic approach to full faith and 
credit limits on choice of law under which a state was prevented from applying its own law only when 
doing so “threatens the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate 
interests of another State.” Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
In that case he found no threat to Wisconsin’s sovereignty interests by Minnesota’s failure to apply 
Wisconsin law in litigation between private parties. Id. at 324–25. 
48. Hall, 440 U.S. at 424 n.24. 
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obliquely that different circumstances might support a different result in 
a future case.49 
Justice Stevens suggested that the Constitution might require states to 
accord sovereign immunity to sister states either to avoid threats to 
cooperative federalism or to avoid interfering with their capacity to fulfill 
sovereign responsibilities. This suggestion has encouraged lawyers50 and 
scholars51 to identify cases that might qualify for constitutionally 
mandated respect for sovereign immunity. But there were reasons to think 
Justice Stevens did not envisage many exceptions. First, he nowhere 
suggested that the impact of the million-dollar judgment on Nevada’s 
capacity to pay debts could constitute the sort of interference with 
sovereign responsibilities. Second, he nowhere else suggested that the 
nature of the claims would affect the claim of the defense to constitutional 
protection. This was probably not an oversight. The only precedent he 
identified had held that one state’s commercial mining operation in a 
neighboring state was shielded by sovereign immunity. In that case from 
the 1920s, the Court confronted the changing nature of sovereign 
activities and concluded that “[w]hat is considered a private purpose to-
day may be a public purpose and governmental function to-morrow.”52 
E. The Dissenters 
Three Justices in two separate dissents argued that states were bound 
by the Constitution to respect sister states’ sovereign immunities defenses. 
The dissenters explained the absence of any express provision in the 
Constitution was due to the fact that the drafters universally assumed that 
states were immune in each other’s courts.53 They contended that the 
federal structure of the Constitution necessarily limited the power of states 
to disregard each other’s sovereign immunity.54 And they located the 
                                                     
49. Id. (“We have no occasion, in this case, to consider whether different state policies, either of 
California or of Nevada, might require a different analysis or a different result.”). 
50. E.g., Brief of the State of West Virginia as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing 
of Nevada, Joined by [41 other states], Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (No. 77-1337) [hereinafter Brief of the 
State of West Virginia]. 
51. Rogers, supra note 11, provides the most probing and persuasive effort to give meaning to the 
limits suggested in footnote 24. His analysis is discussed further infra Part IV. 
52. Paulus v. South Dakota, 201 N.W. 867, 870 (N.D. 1924). 
53. Hall, 440 U.S. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The only reason why this immunity did not 
receive specific mention is that it was too obvious to deserve mention.”); see also id. at 437 (Rehnquist 
and Burger, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they 
were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign 
jurisdictions . . . .”). 
54. Id. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“It is, for me, sufficiently fundamental to our federal 
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judicial authority to recognize such limits in cases that had recognized 
implied rights and powers under the Constitution’s more general 
language.55 
The dissenters also viewed the majority opinion as overbroad, 
observing that the Court’s rule was less restrictive than the one adopted 
by the California court.56 Noting that grounding immunity in state comity 
left no room to impose limits for future constitutional issues in the extreme 
cases addressed in footnote 24, the dissenting opinions predicted that Hall 
would lead to “interstate retaliation that will prove unsettling and 
upsetting for our federal system.”57 
F. Legacy 
The Hall decision should not have caught states by surprise,58 but after 
the decision was announced, forty-one states filed an amicus brief in 
support of Nevada’s petition for rehearing,59 inaugurating efforts by a 
majority of state executive branches to overrule or limit the holding.60 The 
                                                     
structure to have implicit constitutional dimension.”). 
55. Id. at 430 (citing cases recognizing freedom of association and right to travel). 
56. Id. at 428. 
57. Id. at 427 (Blackmun, Burger & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“The federal system . . . is built on notions of state parity . . . . This decision cannot help 
but induce some ‘Balkanization’ in state relationships as States try to isolate assets from foreign 
judgments and generally reduce their contacts with other jurisdictions. That will work to the detriment 
of smaller States—like Nevada—who are more dependent on the facilities of a dominant neighbor—
in this case, California.”). 
58. By the 1970s states were recognized as dividing over whether to respect sister-state sovereign 
immunity. See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Sovereign Immunity Doctrine as Precluding Suit 
Against Sister State for Tort Committed Within Forum State, 81 A.L.R.3d 1239, 1240 (1977) (“In the 
very few reported decisions in which the issue has been discussed, the courts have reached conflicting 
results as to whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes a suit against a sister state for a 
tort allegedly committed within the forum state.”). 
59. Brief of the State of West Virginia, supra note 50. The Court’s docket records no prior 
appearance by amici. A PDF of the docket is on file with the author. There is no indication that amici 
obtained consent of all counsel, as was required by contemporary practice in the absence of a motion, 
nor does the docket indicate that the Court acted on the motion. See SUP. CT. R. 42 (prior to 1980 
renumbering). See generally ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (6th ed. 1986) 
(discussing lack of express authority in rules for amicus brief supporting rehearing, but citing cases 
where such briefs were received and nothing that amicus brief requires either consent of all parties or 
motion). 
60. See Hyatt II Transcript, supra note 1 (referring to state amici appearances in Hyatt). The amici 
followed the lead of Nevada in arguing that the Court’s opinion provided insufficient guidance 
regarding the kind of state activity subject to immunity. Id. at 2–10. Nevada’s petition for rehearing 
raised the additional argument that the Court’s decision failed to provide sufficient guidance on the 
full-faith and credit due to judgments against states. Petition for Rehearing at 2–3, Nevada v. Hall, 
441 U.S. 917 (1979) (No. 77-1337). 
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Nevada legislature expressed its displeasure by enacting a resolution 
supporting a constitutional amendment mandating that states accord 
sovereign immunity to sister states.61 
The reach of the opinion was not always clear to lower courts,62 and 
initial academic reception was critical.63 Nevertheless, neither a 
Constitutional amendment nor act of Congress limited the impact of the 
Court’s decision. Nor did states enter into mutual compacts on the 
subject.64 
From the late 1990s, a series of five-four decisions expanded the scope 
of the Eleventh Amendment, with majority decisions recognizing broad 
historical and structural sources for state sovereign immunity.65 Another 
                                                     
61. See H.R.J. Res. 29, 60th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1979), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/ 
Statutes/60th/Stats1979R01.html#FIz100_zAJRz29 [https://perma.cc/9G4N-CBU4] (showing the 
initial effort for the constitutional amendment by petitioning Congress to begin amendment process 
to adopt the following language: “[e]ach state of the United States shall be immune from any suits in 
law or equity commenced or prosecuted in the courts of another state by citizens of any other state or 
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state”); LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES 
AND MATERIALS 357 (7th ed. 2015). 
62. E.g., Underwood v. Univ. of Ky., 390 So. 3d 433, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (Pearson, J., 
concurring) (arguing Hall’s holding is “expressly limited to effectuating California’s interest in 
providing protection to those who are injured on its highways”). 
63. See Hill, supra note 2, at 582 (Court in Hall was beguiled by comity and “inattentive to the 
implications of our constitutional arrangements”); Richard H. Pierson, Constitutional Law—State 
Sovereign Immunity—Nevada v. Hall, 56 WASH. L. REV. 289, 297 (1981) (“Justice Stevens’ 
conclusion . . . ignores the history and purpose of article III.”); Rebecca Block, Note, State Borders 
Are New Boundaries for Sovereign Immunity—Nevada v. Hall, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 210 (1979) 
(arguing that Court meant to offer restricted exception of sovereign immunity applicable under the 
facts but failed to provide sufficient guidance); David Olenick, Note, Sovereign Immunity in Sister-
State Courts: Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law Solutions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1493, 
1494 (1980) (Hall “threatens to upset the interstate relationships appropriate to the federal system”); 
Note, State Tort Liability in Another State’s Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 189, 197–98 (1979) (Court in 
Hall “did not analyze the implications of its full faith and credit holding” and “gives little precise 
guidance to the lower courts”). 
Criticism has also been directed at the California court’s earlier decision. See Note, Sovereign 
Immunity—May a State Assert in Personam Jurisdiction over a Sister State Without Its Consent? Hall 
v. University of Nevada, 53 B.U. L. REV. 736, 744–45 (1973) (objecting that California court 
disregarded a “core concept of the federal model” based on “paucity of analysis”). But see J. Bruce 
Cross, Note, Hall v. University of Nevada: Sovereign Immunity and the Transitory Action, 27 ARK. 
L. REV. 546 (1973) (describing California decision and observing some uncertainties about its scope 
without suggesting it was constitutionally problematic); Leslie D. Rasmussen, Note, Sovereign 
Immunity—Sovereignty of a State Does Not Extend into the Territory of Another State so as to Create 
Immunity from Suit Arising out of the Sister State’s Activities Within the Boundaries of the Forum 
State—Hall v. University of Nevada, 6 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 585–86 (1973) (observing as settled law 
that “decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the courts of other states have held that this 
sovereignty ends at the state’s boundaries”). 
64. Hyatt II Transcript, supra note 2, at 8–10 (discussing why no states have entered compact on 
subject of sovereign immunity). 
65. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 627 (1999) 
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five-four decision relied on the inherent immunity of states under the 
Constitutional scheme to conclude that Congress lacks authority to subject 
nonconsenting states to private suits even in their own state courts.66 But 
the opinions took care to distinguish those situations, involving conflicts 
of federal and state power, from the situation in Hall.67 
II. SOMETHING NEW: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD V. HYATT 
A. Back Story 
Gilbert P. Hyatt, a California citizen and inventor who held the patent 
on a computer chip,68 moved to Nevada in the early 1990s. Hyatt claims 
he established legal residence in Nevada by October 1991—before he 
received substantial income in patent licensing fees. The state of 
California claims he established residence in Nevada in April 1992 and 
was thus responsible for paying California tax on the income.69 
                                                     
(holding that an express grant of subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts in patent infringement 
claims against states violated the Eleventh Amendment); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) (rejecting constructive waiver of 
sovereign immunity: “the Eleventh Amendment . . . repudiated the central premise of Chisholm that 
the jurisdictional heads of Article III superseded the sovereign immunity that the States possessed 
before entering the Union”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 44 (1996) (holding 
Congress lacks authority under Article I to authorize private lawsuit against non-consenting state). 
66. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 710, 712 (1999); see also id. at 713 (Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court provided the most ambitious argument that “States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional 
Amendments”); id. at 728 (concluding that early authorities agreed that “sovereign immunity derives 
not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitution itself”); id. at 
753; id. at 760, 762–95 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion for four Justices 
challenged the majority’s constitutional history). 
67. Id. at 739 (noting that Hall distinguished issue of state immunity in sister state from immunity 
in federal court, adding that Court’s reluctance in Hall to find implied limitation on power of state 
forum did not suggest reluctance to find implied constitutional limit on power of federal government 
inasmuch as states had residual attributes of sovereigns while federal government had only those 
powers expressly granted under the Constitution).  
68. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 131 (Nev. 2014), rev’d, Hyatt II, __ U.S. __, 
136 S. Ct. 1277, 1278–80 (2016) (containing the most complete record of the facts and procedural 
history). Although Hyatt held a patent on which he was receiving substantial licensing revenues in 
1991, he stopped receiving patent license income from Japan during the audit, and he apparently lost 
the patent as the result of a legal challenge to its validity. Hyatt, 335 P.3d at 133, 152. 
69. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 490–91 (2003) [hereinafter Hyatt I]. The tax liability 
with interest and penalties would total more than ten million dollars. See Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1284 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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In 1998, while Hyatt’s tax liability was pending before administrative 
agencies in California,70 Hyatt commenced a civil action in Nevada state 
court against the California Franchise Tax Board, the California state 
agency responsible for investigating and assessing the tax. The Nevada 
lawsuit alleged various negligent and intentional torts in connection with 
California’s investigation and sought compensatory damages and punitive 
damages.71 
Hyatt also sought a declaratory judgment regarding the key issue in his 
California tax dispute: his legal residence in 1991 and 1992. The trial court 
granted the tax board partial summary judgment on this issue, leaving that 
issue to be resolved in California administrative proceedings.72 Hyatt 
never appealed that court ruling. 
Justice Breyer would later summarize Hyatt’s tort claims: “Hyatt 
sought damages for what he considered the board’s abusive audit and 
investigation practices, including rifling through his private mail, 
combing through his garbage, and examining private activities at this 
place of worship.”73 The Chief Justice described the claims more fully: 
In the course of the audit, employees of the [California agency] 
traveled to Nevada and allegedly peered through Hyatt’s 
windows, rummaged around in his garbage, contacted his 
estranged family members, and shared his personal information 
not only with newspapers but also with his business contacts and 
even his place of worship. Hyatt claims that one employee in 
particular had it in for him, referring to him in anti-Semitic terms 
and taking “trophy-like pictures” in front of his home after the 
audit.74 
When the trial court rejected the defense of sovereign immunity,75 the 
California Franchise Tax Board sought a writ of mandamus or prohibition 
                                                     
70. Hyatt, 335 P.3d at 132 (observing that action was pending in California courts). The California 
audit initially determined that Hyatt was a California resident at the time he received the taxable 
income. His challenge to the audit’s findings led to an eleven-year administrative proceeding, which 
eventually upheld the California audit, but he was still challenging the agency in California in 2016. 
See Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1284 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (observing Hyatt challenging action in 
California courts). But see Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (stating that 
Nevada opinion erred in stating that Hyatt’s challenge was pending in California courts). 
71. Hyatt I, 538 U.S. at 491. 
72. Hyatt, 335 P.3d at 132. 
73. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280. 
74. Id. at 1284 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
75. See Hyatt I, 538 U.S. at 492 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 860.2 (West 2002)). The tax 
board contended specifically that California immunity law should apply to the extent that it 
established immunity for public entities and employees for injuries caused by commencing judicial 
or administrative proceedings related to collecting tax or for interpreting or applying laws related to 
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in the Nevada Supreme Court, seeking either to require dismissal or to 
limit the scope of the suit to claims arising from its conduct in Nevada.76 
1. Interim Appeal and Hyatt I 
The Nevada Supreme Court granted the California agency partial relief. 
The Court held that principles of comity required the trial court to dismiss 
the negligence claim but held that the intentional tort claims could proceed 
to trial.77 In 2003, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt78 [hereinafter Hyatt I], the 
Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice 
O’Connor explained that the Constitution did not require Nevada to give 
full faith and credit to California’s statute providing the state agency with 
immunity from suit.79 In contrast to the “exacting” full faith and credit due 
to sister-state judgments,80 she emphasized that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not require one state to implement the statute law of another 
state regarding a subject that it is itself competent to legislate.81 She 
observed that Nevada was obviously competent to legislate regarding 
injurious conduct within its territory.82 Under settled legal principles, the 
choice of Nevada law was constitutionally permissible so long as the state 
had “a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating 
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair.”83 
Justice O’Connor explained why the Court refused to adopt a special 
rule that would require recognizing sister-state immunity when necessary 
to avoid interference with a state’s “capacity to fulfill its own sovereign 
responsibilities.”84 First, the proposed rule would have committed the 
Court to evaluating the respective legislative needs of the states, but the 
Court’s historic experience with a balancing approach to full faith and 
credit obligations had proved unsatisfactory.85 Second, she observed that 
                                                     
tax. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id.  
78. Hyatt I, 538 U.S. 488 (2003). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 494 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998)).  
81. Id. (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (quoting Pac. Ins. Co. v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939))). 
82. Id. at 494. 
83. Id. at 494–95 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
84. Id. at 495. 
85. Id. at 486. 
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the Court had rejected any special need to protect core sovereignty 
functions when it rejected constitutionally based claims for sister-state 
immunity.86 
In sum, Justice O’Connor rejected the proposed rule because it would 
require the Court to choose between the sovereign interest of California 
and Nevada, where “the question of which sovereign interest should be 
deemed more weighty is not one that can be easily answered.”87 And she 
observed that the sovereign function exception would be neither limited 
nor easily administered by comparing the tax-collecting activity in Hyatt 
to the transportation services in Hall.88 
The Court did not find all state sovereignty interests beyond the scope 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; it observed that the Clause prevented 
policies of judicial hostility to the legislation of sister states. “But we are 
not presented here with a case in which a State has exhibited a ‘policy of 
hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State.”89 And the Court found that 
the Nevada Supreme Court had “sensitively applied principles of comity 
with a healthy regard for California’s sovereign status . . . .”90 
2. Trial and Appeal in Nevada Courts 
Following Hyatt I, the case returned to the trial court. Three issues had 
been resolved as a matter of law in favor of the tax board. First, in keeping 
with the early pretrial determination that the issue of Hyatt’s legal 
residence should be determined in California, the case was structured to 
avoid having the issue of the accuracy of the audit presented to the jury.91 
Second, the Nevada Supreme Court had determined that the tax board 
enjoyed immunity for claims of negligence. Third, the trial court granted 
summary judgment to the tax board on the matter of economic damages.92 
                                                     
86. Id. at 497 (Justice O’Connor emphasized that the state of California did not ask the Court to 
overrule Hall). 
87. Id. at 498. 
88. Id. at 498–99 (“To be sure, the power to promulgate and enforce income tax laws is an essential 
attribute of sovereignty. . . . But the university employee’s education mission in Hall might also be 
so described.”). 
89. Id. at 499. 
90. Id. 
91. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 133 (Nev. 2014) (“[T]he parties were required to 
litigate the action under the restraint that any determinations as to the audits’ accuracy were not part 
of Hyatt’s tort action and the jury would not make any findings as to when Hyatt moved to Nevada 
or whether the audits’ conclusions were correct.”). 
92. Id. Hyatt produced an expert who opined that the tax board’s communication with persons in 
Japan caused the termination of his patent income from Japan. The trial court concluded that the 
evidence was speculative and granted summary judgment. Id. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. 
06 - Hoffheimer.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  8:49 AM 
2017] THE NEW SISTER-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1789 
 
The surviving intentional torts—invasion of privacy, breach of 
confidential relationship, abuse of process, fraud, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress—were tried before a jury for 
“approximately four months.”93 The jury found for the plaintiff on all 
claims and returned special verdicts awarding damages in the amount of 
$52 million for invasion of privacy, $85 million for emotional distress, 
and $1,085,281.56 for fraud.94 The jury also awarded $250 million in 
punitive damages, and a special master fixed costs at $2.5 million.95 
On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court held that three of the five 
intentional tort claims failed as a matter of law.96 But the Court found that 
there was sufficient evidence to support the fraud claim based on the tax 
board’s representations that it would treat Hyatt courteously and fairly and 
treat his communications confidentially.97 And the Court adopted a 
“sliding scale” approach to intentional infliction of emotion distress under 
which evidence of physical harm or other objectively verifiable injury 
would not be required for more egregious forms of conduct.98 Applying 
this sliding scale to the facts, the Court determined that “this case is at the 
more extreme end of the scale,”99 and, consequently, concluded that 
Hyatt’s claim was supported by sufficient evidence.100 
The state Supreme Court also disallowed most of the damages. It 
rejected all punitive damages on the ground that punitive damages are 
available against a sovereign only when expressly authorized by statute,101 
                                                     
Id. at 157. 
93. Id. at 130, 133–34. 
94. Id. at 134 (designating the fraud award as “special damages” without further explanation of 
their source). 
95. Id. The trial judge approved the master’s recommendation. These were reversed on appeal as 
part of the reversal regarding damages. In addition, the court held that the trial judge erred in refusing 
to permit the tax board to object before entry of the award. Id. at 155. 
96. Id. at 130. The invasion of privacy claims failed because the private facts that were allegedly 
disclosed were available from public records or known to the third persons to which they were 
communicated, and because Hyatt failed to adduce legal authority to support his claimed expectation 
of privacy in his trash or in packages delivered outside his door. Id. at 140, 140 n.8. The breach of 
confidential relationship claim failed because there was no confidential relationship. Id. at 143. The 
abuse of process claim failed because the defendant did not employ legal process. Id. at 144. 
97. Id. at 145 (evidence supporting the fraud claim included that the main auditor was biased 
against Hyatt, made negative comments about his religion, and was “intent on imposing an 
assessment . . . and that [the tax board] promoted a culture in which tax assessments were the end goal 
whenever an audit was undertaken”).  
98. Id. at 147–48. 
99. Id. at 148. 
100. Id. at 149. 
101. Id. at 154 (finding that the general statute authorizing punitive damages was not sufficient to 
overcome the presumption against punitive damages and stating, “[t]he broad allowance for punitive 
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extending to California the same sovereign immunity enjoyed by Nevada 
as a matter of comity.102 
In contrast, the Court upheld the special damages awards against the 
tax board on the fraud claim.103 The reported decisions do not explain the 
components of the special damages,104 but the tax board did not contend 
that the verdict was unsupported by evidence. Rather, it argued that 
compensatory damages must be capped at $50,000 as a matter of comity 
because the tax board was totally immune under California law and the 
state of Nevada waived immunity in such claims only to a maximum of 
$50,000.105 
The Nevada Court acknowledged that a majority of state courts 
recognized a sister state’s immunity to the extent that they accorded 
immunity to their own sovereign.106 But the Court chose to follow 
authority that refused to extend immunity to sister states when doing so 
conflicted with forum policies.107 It found that subordinating Nevada’s 
policy of compensation for Nevada citizens to goals of comity would 
violate public policy.108 Because comity was the only challenge to the 
special damages, the Court affirmed the amount of the award.109 
Finally, the Court upheld liability for fraud and intentional infliction of 
extreme emotional distress but reversed on other claims.110 It upheld the 
award of $1 million damages for fraud but reversed the award of $85 
million damages for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress 
and reversed the award of costs.111 And it ordered a new trial due to 
evidentiary errors and errors in jury instructions that permitted the jury to 
                                                     
damages under [the statute] does not authorize punitive damages against a government entity”). 
102. Id. (“Further, under comity principles, we afford FTB the protections of California immunity 
to the same degree as we would provide immunity to a Nevada government entity . . . .”). 
103. Id. 
104. See id. at 145 (Hyatt introduced evidence that the delay in audit cost him $8,000 per day in 
accrued interest and fines). 
105. Id. at 146. 
106. Id. (citing Sam v. Estate of Sam, 134 P.3d 761 (N.M. 2006); Hansen v. Scott, 687 N.W.2d 
247, 250 (N.D. 2004); Solomon v. Sup. Ct. of Fla., 816 A.2d 788, 790 (D.C. 2002); McDonnell v. 
Illinois, 748 A.2d 1105 (N.J. 2000); Schoeberlein v Purdue Univ., 544 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ill. 1989)). 
It is not clear from the opinion the Nevada court viewed the majority rule as constitutionally 
compelled, though it noted the Sam court’s reliance on Hall and Hyatt I. Id. at 146. 
107. Id. at 146–47 (citing and following Faulkner v. Univ. of Tenn., 627 So. 2d 362, 363–64 (Ala. 
1992)). 
108. Id. at 147.  
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 149. 
111. Id. at 147, 153–54. 
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consider the accuracy of the audit,112 prevented the tax board from 
rebutting evidence of spoliation,113 and prevented the tax board from 
showing the loss of Hyatt’s patent and a federal tax audit.114 
B. The New Doctrine in Hyatt II 
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review two issues: 1) 
whether to overrule Hall, and 2) “[w]hether Nevada may refuse to extend 
to sister States hailed into Nevada courts the same immunities Nevada 
enjoys in those courts.”115 
1. Failure to Overrule Hall 
The state of California focused its efforts on the first issue, devoting 
more space to it in the petition for certiorari and in its brief,116 opening 
with the issue during argument, returning to it when Justice Breyer sought 
to turn discussion to the second issue, and addressing it exclusively in 
closing.117 Forty-six states supported California’s argument that the Court 
should overrule Hall.118 
                                                     
112. Id. at 149–51. 
113. Id. at 152. 
114. Id. The trial court had excluded evidence that the patent had been determined invalid and that 
Hyatt had been subjected to a federal tax audit on the ground that it was more prejudicial than 
probative. Id. The court reversed, finding that it was more probative than prejudicial. Id. The court 
does not explain why it affirmed the judgment of liability obtained in the absence of this evidence, 
given that it seems that a properly informed jury might not have found that the emotional distress was 
caused by the tax board’s wrongdoing rather than the other events they did not consider. Id. at 148, 
157. Under Nevada law, the extreme and outrageous conduct must cause the emotional distress. Id. 
at 147. 
115. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hyatt II, __ U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175). The 
Court granted the petition as to the second and third questions presented but did not agree to review 
the first question, “[w]hether the federal discretionary-function immunity rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), 
is categorically inapplicable to intentional torts and bad-faith conduct.” Id.; see also Franchise Tax 
Bd. v. Hyatt, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2940 (2015) (granting petition for writ but limiting to questions 
two and three). 
116. The petition for certiorari allocated nine pages to the first issue and six pages to the second; 
the brief allocated thirty-two pages to the first issue, eight pages to the second. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 115, at 21–35; Brief of Petitioner at 17–57, Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (No. 14-
1175). 
117. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–18, 21–26, 53–58, Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (No. 14-1175) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. 
118. The total number of states supporting reversal of Hall was announced during argument. Id. at 
10. The multi-state tax commission and forty-three states had filed amicus curiae briefs supporting 
the tax board before the Nevada Supreme Court. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 134 n.4 
(Nev. 2014). In briefs, these states addressed only the issue of overruling Hall. See Brief of the State 
of West Virginia, supra note 50. 
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The Court’s attention was also evidently focused on the issue of 
whether to overrule Hall, as Justice Breyer was the only member of the 
Court who requested counsel to address the second issue during 
argument.119 
Because the Court was equally divided, it was unable to overrule 
Hall.120 Yet the fact that the Court was equally divided indicated that a 
growing number of members of the Court were willing to find that the 
Constitution required states to respect sister states’ claims to sovereign 
immunity, and it is tempting to speculate that, had Justice Scalia lived, he 
would have cast the necessary vote to overrule Hall.121 And the public 
announcement of division on the issue after such intense debate 
constituted an invitation to the states to bring the issue back to the Court 
in the future. 
2. Limiting Hall by Requiring Parity 
Rarely has a member of the Court announced so clearly an interest in a 
radical new rule of constitutional jurisprudence as when Justice Breyer 
stated during oral argument: 
 Now, I would like just two minutes on what’s bothering me. And 
what is bothering me is I really don’t see how Nevada can say, 
we’re going to give immunity to our own State but we won’t 
accept California’s similar immunity. Now, that doesn’t seem 
intuitively right, but if I look at the Constitution, I see it says this. 
It says: “Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the 
public acts of other States.” 
. . . . 
 So I say, how does Nevada get away with that? Answer: Because 
they have a strong public policy in not doing it; namely, the policy 
of they don’t give anybody, including their own officials, that 
kind of immunity. 
 If that’s the answer, that answer runs out of steam at the very 
point that they try to give officials more immunity than California 
is giving. 
                                                     
119. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 18, 40. 
120. See Pidot, supra note 8. 
121. During argument, Justice Scalia expressed his opinion that the Court’s cases applying the 
Eleventh Amendment rested on the assumption that states could not be sued without their consent in 
either federal or state court. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 34–35. Even if this 
represented his final view after deliberation, however, it would not necessarily mean he was prepared 
to overrule precedent. 
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 Now, you see how I’ve lined up that legal reasoning with what 
seems intuitive. But I have no idea, to tell you the truth, about 
whether there is precedent for that; about what that might, in fact, 
get us into trouble on; or et cetera. 
 So I would—you must have thought through this. If I look in the 
briefs, the answer to this question of equal treatment—I can’t find 
much.122 
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, devoted the bulk of his opinion 
to providing constitutional grounding for the intuition he articulated 
during argument that state courts must accord other states at least as much 
sovereign immunity as they accord to their own states. 
Without help from counsel,123 Justice Breyer found the desired Full 
Faith and Credit Clause precedent in three cases that, he characterized, 
demonstrated a well-established requirement that a forum court’s 
disregard of a foreign state’s law not be based on a “policy of hostility” to 
the foreign law.124 Although the “policy of hostility” language derived 
from Justice O’Connor’s caveat in Hyatt I,125 the case she quoted provided 
no useful authority.126 He relied instead on two other decisions.127 From 
                                                     
122. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 40–41. 
123. Not one of the twelve briefs submitted by parties and amici (including nine prominent 
professors specializing in federal jurisdiction) cited either Broderick or Hughes. Only the parties’ 
briefs discussed Carroll v. Lanza, despite the Court’s previous attention to that authority in Hyatt I, 
538 U.S. 448, 499 (2003) (“[T]he Court is not presented here with a case in which a State has exhibited 
a ‘policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State.” (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 
413 (1955))). 
124. Hyatt I, 538 U.S. at 499. 
125. Id. (quoting Carroll, 349 U.S. at 412–13); see also Hyatt II, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 
(2016) (“We followed this same approach when we considered the litigation now before us for the 
first time.”). Justice Alito shared Justice Breyer’s interest in the problem of hostility, posing a question 
during argument about whether the Constitution provided any limits on a state disregarding another 
state’s law due to hostility. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 49–50. 
126. The language occurred in the context of a case where the forum applied forum law to a 
personal injury caused in its state. Finding no full faith and credit problem, the Court distinguished 
Hughes and Broderick and observed the state “is not adopting any policy of hostility.” Carroll, 349 
U.S. at 413.  
Two other early published discussions of the decision noted the Court’s treatment of Carroll and 
case law precedent. One concluded that “Carroll stands for exactly the opposite proposition for which 
Hyatt II cited it.” Patrick J. Borchers, Is the Supreme Court Really Going to Regulate Choice of Law 
Involving States?, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 7, 13 (2016). Another observed, “[w]hile Hyatt II extended 
precedent in novel ways, it did so in fealty to a tradition of pragmatic experimentation expressed in 
that same case.” Casenote, The Supreme Court 2015 Term: Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 317, 322 (2016). 
127. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1281 (citing and discussing Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611–12 
(1951) (holding that Wisconsin statute that prevented litigation of Illinois cause of action violated full 
faith and credit when Wisconsin permitted litigation of comparable Wisconsin claims); Broderick v. 
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 642–43 (1935) (holding full faith and credit prevented New Jersey from 
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these he reasoned that Nevada’s failure to extend to a sister state the same 
measure of immunity that Nevada enjoyed embodied “a special rule of 
law applicable only in lawsuits against its sister States,” a rule 
“inconsistent with the general principles of Nevada immunity law,” and 
“a special and discriminatory rule.”128 Finding that Nevada offered no 
“sufficient policy considerations” for the rule that discriminated against 
California law,129 he concluded that the failure to accord California the 
immunity extended to Nevada’s own sovereign as a defendant “lacks the 
‘healthy regard for California’s sovereign status’ that was the hallmark of 
[the Court’s] earlier decision, and it reflects a constitutionally 
impermissible ‘policy of hostility to the public Acts of a sister State.’”130 
The Court vacated the judgment below “insofar as the Nevada Supreme 
Court has declined to apply California law in favor of a special rule of 
Nevada law that is hostile to its sister States . . . .”131 
3. The Dissent 
Three Justices did not agree with the Court’s opinion on the Full Faith 
and Credit issue. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment without 
explaining why he did not join the opinion.132 The Chief Justice and 
Justice Thomas dissented and expressed their disagreement with the parity 
requirement.133 
The dissenting opinion identified an obstacle to requiring full faith and 
credit for sister-state defenses of sovereign immunity. The dissent pointed 
out that the Court has consistently construed the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause to assure a state’s broad freedom to disregard foreign laws—as 
distinct from rights reduced to foreign judgments—with respect to 
“subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”134 The 
Court had specifically recognized in Hyatt I that a state is competent to 
apply its law without violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause so long as 
                                                     
refusing to enforce New York claims by applying burdensome requirements to foreign claims that it 
did not apply to comparable New Jersey claims)). 
128. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1282. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 1282–83 (quoting Hyatt I, 538 U.S. 448, 499 (2003)). 
131. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1283. After remand the Nevada Supreme Court held punitive damages 
were not available and limited compensatory damages to $50,000. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 401 
P.3d 1110, 1117–18 (Nev. 2017). 
132. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1283. 
133. Id. at 1283–88. 
134. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939), quoted in Hyatt 
II, 136 S. Ct. at 1286 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). 
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there is a significant contact in the state creating state interests served by 
the application of its law.135 The dissenters regarded the injury of a 
Nevada citizen in Nevada as satisfying the requirements for applying 
Nevada law.136 The Chief Justice wrote, “[t]his Court has generally held 
that when a State chooses ‘to apply its own rule of law to give affirmative 
relief for an action arising within its borders,’ the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause is satisfied.”137 
The dissenters also questioned the majority’s determination that 
Nevada had adopted a policy of hostility towards California as a 
sovereign, finding, on the contrary, that Nevada offered sufficient policy 
justifications for applying Nevada’s law of full compensation to foreign 
sovereigns.138 The dissenters emphasized that Hyatt I had never required 
comity but had only referred with approval to the Nevada Supreme 
Court’s adoption of restraint as a matter of comity as evidence of 
Nevada’s healthy regard for the sister state’s sovereign status.139 
Finally, the dissenters maintained that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
either applied or it did not.140 They thus read the Clause as effectively 
mandating a choice of law between either Nevada’s rejection of sovereign 
immunity or California’s total immunity.141 Accordingly, they disagreed 
with the remedy mandated by the majority, which prohibited Nevada from 
treating California like a private party under Nevada law but fell short of 
requiring Nevada to recognize the full immunity available to the state 
under California law.142 They characterized this as “a new hybrid rule, 
under which the Board enjoys partial immunity.”143 
                                                     
135. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
136. “This Court has long recognized that ‘[f]ew matters could be deemed more appropriately the 
concern of the state in which the injury occurs or more completely within its power’ than ‘the bodily 
safety and economic protection’ of people injured within its borders.” Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1286–87 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 503). 
137. Id. at 1286 (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955)).  
138. Id. at 1287. 
139. Id. The Chief Justice observed that similar indications of such healthy disregard were evident 
in the Nevada Supreme Court decision under review in Hyatt II, where the Nevada court had 




143. Id. at 1288. The Chief Justice insisted that “[w]here the Clause applies, it expressly requires a 
State to give full faith and credit to another State’s laws.” Id. (emphasis in original). The Court has, 
however, required states to give full faith and credit to part of another state’s law in a case. See, e.g., 
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that full faith and credit and due process 
require court to apply a state’s substantive law to claim but do not require application of same state’s 
statute of limitations). 
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH PARITY 
Hyatt II requires states to extend to sister states at least as much 
sovereign immunity as they accord to their own sovereigns. This parity 
policy is grounded on the assumption that doing otherwise must stem from 
a constitutionally prohibited hostility to sister-state law. In the context of 
the Court’s equal division on the constitutional validity of Hall, parity 
presents a pragmatic compromise and has the intuitive appeal of equal 
treatment. By effectively shielding states from excessive liability in the 
courts of other states, the decision may postpone the need to revisit the 
controversial issue of the validity of Hall. 
Nevertheless, the rule of parity is constitutionally problematic. This 
part of the Article questions the reasoning offered by the Court in support 
of the new doctrine. It explores the lack of authority for parity in case law; 
it exposes the uncertain scope of the parity requirement; and it contends 
that the new rule is undesirable both because it provides insufficient 
immunity to states for sovereign acts performed in their own territory and 
because it overprotects states for injuries they cause in other states. 
A. Sovereign Parity Is Not Supported by the Cases 
Justice Breyer found authority for constitutional parity in two older 
cases where states applied forum law and refused to recognize claims 
based on sister-state statutes. In both cases, the Court emphasized that 
forum law would have permitted the claims if they had arisen in the forum 
state. In both cases, the Court held that full faith and credit required the 
forums to recognize the forum claims.144 
Neither decision formulated anything like a rule of parity, and both 
emphasized the need to limit the decisions to their unusual facts. In 
Broderick v. Rosner,145 the superintendent of the banks of New York 
sought to collect assessments in New Jersey court against New Jersey 
residents.146 The New Jersey courts held the action was properly 
dismissed under a New Jersey statute requiring the joinder of the bank and 
all stockholders for claims arising from the laws of foreign states and 
foreign countries.147 The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, 
                                                     
144. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1281 (citing Hughes v. Fetter, 349 U.S. 609 (1951); Broderick v. Rosner, 
294 U.S. 629 (1935)). 
145. 294 U.S. 629 (1935). 
146. Id. at 642–43. A New York statute imposed several liabilities on stockholders for the debts of 
the bank up to the par value of their shares or their investment in the bank. Id. 
147. Id. 
06 - Hoffheimer.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  8:49 AM 
2017] THE NEW SISTER-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 1797 
 
Justice Brandeis observed that forum requirement that the action proceed 
as a bill in equity was acceptable, but he explained that requiring joinder 
of all shareholders as necessary parties “imposes a condition which, as 
here applied, is legally impossible of fulfillment.”148 
To be sure, the forum statute discriminated on its face against foreign 
claims, and, except for the statute, the action could have been permitted 
under New York law.149 But the Court did not hold that full faith and credit 
prevented application of forum law just based on discrimination or 
hostility. Rather the Court found a complete absence of forum authority 
to legislate in an area peculiarly governed by sister-state law. Justice 
Brandeis accepted that valid procedural interests might justify dismissal 
of a claim brought under foreign law.150 But he emphasized that the effect 
of applying forum law was to deny a remedy151 and he noted that the 
assessed liability was an “incident” of a corporation and thus “peculiarly 
within the regulatory power of New York, as the State of 
incorporation.”152 The Court’s decision was not beyond doubt. By 
dissenting without opinion, Justice Cardozo signaled that there were 
grounds for questioning the decision.153 
Moreover, Broderick predated the Court’s modern approach to full 
faith and credit for statutes in Pacific Employers154 and stemmed from the 
era when the Court was grappling with the inadequacies of its full faith 
and credit doctrine.155 The opinion was never previously read as authority 
                                                     
148. Id. at 639. 
149. Id. at 640. The case thus fell under the familiar doctrine that where states are concededly 
required to extend full faith and credit to the law of a sister state, they may not evade the liability by 
depriving their court of jurisdiction. Id. at 642 (citing Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, 252 
U.S. 411, 415 (1920)).  
150. Id. at 643 (citing Anglo-Am. Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903) 
(Holmes, J.)) (observing that a court may dismiss forum claim under doctrine of forum non 
conveniens in some cases). The cited authority held that a state may deny its courts jurisdiction to 
enforce an action on a foreign judgment by a foreign corporation against a foreign corporation. See 
Kenney, 252 U.S. at 411. 
151. Broderick, 294 U.S. at 643 (holding that the state “may not, under the guise of merely affecting 
the remedy, deny the enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit 
clause”). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
154. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939). 
155. Pacific Employers held that more than one state’s law may constitutionally apply to the same 
occurrence or transaction. Prior to that decision, the Court adopted a balancing test and imposed full-
faith and credit obligations as a choice-of-law, requiring the application of sister-state laws even in 
situations where forum states had legitimate reasons for applying their own law. See generally PETER 
HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.24, at 188–89 (5th ed. 2010); KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 120–21 (2010); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
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for a general full faith and credit requirement to give equal treatment to 
other states’ positive laws. Members of the Court cited it twice in the past 
sixty years, on neither occasion as evidence of a full faith and credit policy 
against hostility.156 
Justice Breyer was on firmer ground in reading Hughes v. Fetter157 as 
authority for the rule of parity. That decision has been regarded as 
prohibiting on full faith and credit grounds one state’s rejection of another 
state’s law when the forum state has policy objections to the other state’s 
law other than the fact that it is foreign.158 
Hughes was decided in 1951 during the era when the Court’s full faith 
and credit jurisprudence differentiated sharply between foreign rights and 
judgments, and when the Court permitted a state to apply its own laws so 
long as it had a legitimate reason for doing so.159 Under this approach, full 
faith and credit would never compel a state to renounce its common law 
and enforce claims under a sister-state statute so long as the forum had a 
legitimate reason for applying its common law rule. The novel question 
in Hughes was whether one state, in enacting a statutory recovery for 
                                                     
§ 9.3A, at 694–95 (6th ed. 2010) (discussing Pacific Employers as turning point in Court’s repudiation 
of balancing approach to full faith and credit cases).  
Justice Breyer acknowledged the significance of the Court’s abandonment of the balancing 
approach when he emphasized that the decision in Hyatt II was not a return to the old balancing 
approach: “[l]ong ago this Court’s effort to apply that kind of analysis led to results that seemed to 
differ depending [on the kind of case before the Court. . . . We have since abandoned that 
approach. . . .” Hyatt II, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1283 (2016).  
156. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381 (1990) (citing Broderick for authority that state cannot 
avoid full faith and credit obligation by depriving its courts of jurisdiction); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186, 228 n.8 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Broderick for authority that states may 
dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens). One state court referred to the opinion as an example 
of an approach that the Supreme Court had repudiated. Clark v. Rockwell, 435 S.E.2d 664, 667 (W. 
Va. 1993) (“There are some earlier United States Supreme Court cases in which it appears that public 
policy considerations might be relevant if the public policy differential between the two states is 
substantial. . . . However, later cases appear to hold that the forum state’s public policy cannot 
override the enforcement of a valid judgment rendered in a sister state.” (citing Broderick, 294 U.S. 
629 (1935))). 
157. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611–12 (1951) (holding that Wisconsin statute that prevented 
litigation of Illinois cause of action violated full faith and credit when Wisconsin permitted litigation 
of comparable Wisconsin claims). 
158. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 402 
(3d ed. 2016) (discussing constitutional limits on disregarding sister-state law). 
159. See generally PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.24, at 188–90 (5th ed. 2010) 
(discussing emergence of rule by mid-twentieth century that forum did not violate full faith and credit 
when it disregarded sister-state law and applied forum law when doing so served forum state interest). 
See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) (holding state must give full faith and credit 
to sister state judgment even if rendering state failed to give full faith and credit to other state); 
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (holding forum must give full faith and credit to sister-state 
judgment even where rendering court’s judgment violated forum policy). 
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wrongful death, could limit its recovery to claims arising in Illinois and 
prevent its courts from hearing claims arising under the statutes of other 
states. 
The claims arose from a fatal car accident in Illinois involving a driver 
and passenger who were residents of Wisconsin. The decedent’s estate 
brought a wrongful death action in Wisconsin under the Illinois statute,160 
and the Wisconsin court dismissed under the local statute that authorized 
wrongful death actions only for deaths that occurred in Wisconsin.161 
The outcome depended, in part, on how the case was characterized. If 
the chronology were emphasized, then Wisconsin would not be refusing 
to enforce foreign rights unreasonably; it would merely be enacting a new 
statutory remedy and strictly limiting its application. If the effect of the 
legislation were emphasized, then Wisconsin would not be recognizing a 
claim based on Illinois law for the sole reason that the claim was based on 
Illinois law. 
The Court was sharply divided in holding that full faith and credit 
required Wisconsin to recognize the claim arising under Illinois’s 
wrongful death statute. Writing for five members of the Court, Justice 
Black explained that the outcome required balancing the “strong unifying 
principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause” and the forum 
state’s policy against entertaining the cause of action.162 For him the 
balancing evaluation was easy because Wisconsin’s enactment for a local 
wrongful death recovery showed the forum “has no real feeling of 
antagonism against wrongful death suits in general.”163 While forum 
procedural interests might sometimes limit recovery to local claims and 
support dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens, Justice Black 
emphasized that the strong connections with the forum eliminated such 
policy arguments against maintaining the action.164 
Four Justices dissented, arguing plausibly that Supreme Court 
decisions to date had established no clear full faith and credit obligation 
to displace any local law and enforce foreign claims.165 Moreover, they 
insisted that Wisconsin’s limit was neither novel nor unreasonable, and 
they identified valid and legitimate reasons for limiting recovery to deaths 
                                                     
160. The Wisconsin court may have been the only court with personal jurisdiction at that time. 
Hughes, 341 U.S. at 613. 
161. Id. at 610. 
162. Id. at 612. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 613. 
165. Id. at 618 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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occurring in state and for refusing to recognize claims for deaths in sister 
states.166 
The balancing evaluation adopted by the majority in Hughes was an 
artifact of the Court’s earlier approach to full faith and credit and 
unnecessary to the Court’s outcome. Justice Black relied on the complete 
absence of forum policy in finding that the balance decisively favored 
enforcement of the claim arising under sister-state law.167 The absence of 
any local policy meant that the local rule was irrational. Nevertheless, the 
Court did not strike the local law on grounds of hostility to foreign law.168 
Neither Broderick nor Hughes established anything like a general full 
faith and credit prohibition against judicial hostility to sister-state laws. 
Nor did those opinions announce a general requirement of parity in 
treating foreign laws. The decisions rejected forum procedural bars 
against causes of action (not defenses) arising under sister-state statutes. 
The reasoning offered by the majority in both decisions was rooted in a 
balancing approach that predates current full faith and credit 
jurisprudence, and neither opinion addressed the unique issues presented 
by defenses of sovereigns for the values of cooperative federalism. 
While neither decision expressly required parity in treating foreign 
laws, each found a full faith and credit violation when there was no 
identifiable forum policy supporting the unequal treatment of rights 
arising under sister-state law.169 Even if the decisions were understood to 
mandate a practical rule of parity, they would not apply to the obligation 
to respect sister-state immunity in Hyatt II for two reasons. 
First, Nevada was not disregarding general rights arising under sister-
state law; it was disregarding a special defense unique to the sovereign 
                                                     
166. Id. (arguing that a forum state may want to limit causes of action territorially so that witnesses 
will be available and courts familiar with the statute; arguing conversely that forum may reasonably 
not want to enforce claims arising under sister state law where witnesses would not be available and 
where the forum may be unfamiliar with the details of foreign law). The position of the dissent was 
strengthened by fact that other states, including Illinois, imposed similar territorial restrictions in 
wrongful death litigation. 
167. Id. 
168. On the contrary, the basis of the decision was narrow and, judging by contemporary 
commentators, its effect was not especially clear. See Lee H. Henkel, Jr., Full Faith and Credit to 
Public Acts: The Significance of Hughes v. Fetter, 2 DUKE B.J. 40, 52 (1951) (“Just what the legal 
profession is to expect in the future is uncertain.”). 
169. The holding in both cases comports with the general requirement in later cases that for a state’s 
law to apply, both due process and full faith and credit Clauses require the state to have “a significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is 
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981); id. 
at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting) (agreeing with rule). This was followed in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985). But, the Court subsequently clarified that significant contacts are 
not required for traditional procedural rules. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 725–27 (1988). 
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defendant. Justice Breyer worked to characterize the facts of Hyatt II so 
as to bring the case under the general parity requirement. Thus, he 
described the Nevada decision not to apply caps available in claims 
against the state of Nevada to the claim against the state of California as 
“a special rule of law applicable only in lawsuits against its sister States, 
such as California.”170 But this was not the case. The lack of caps was in 
fact the general rule applicable to all defendants (other than the state of 
Nevada). It was not a rule directed exclusively or even primarily against 
sister states as defendants.171 In short, the Court’s parity analysis assumes 
that sister-state sovereigns are lawfully entitled to comparable legal 
treatment in the context of sovereign immunity. But this is exactly the 
question to be decided. 
Second, Nevada had identifiable, legitimate reasons for refusing to 
extend the defense to sister sovereigns.172 Ironically, Nevada sought to 
provide the very compensatory relief whose denial was a full faith and 
credit violation in Broderick and Hughes. 
B. The Scope of Sovereign Parity Remains Uncertain 
The precise command of Hyatt II is uncertain when a forum state seeks 
to impose greater liability against a sister state than would be available 
against the sister state in the sister state’s own courts. In Hyatt, the state 
of California had a complete defense under California law. Under those 
circumstances, the Court held that California got the benefit of Nevada’s 
caps on damages available in litigation against the state of Nevada. But 
what if California had no defense at all under California law? Would 
Nevada courts be free to impose unlimited liability? Or would they be 
obligated to extend the same limits to California available to Nevada? 
Similar problems would arise where a sister state’s immunity law 
permits certain kinds of claims or certain remedies that are not available 
in the forum’s courts against the forum state. And comparable problems 
could arise with respect to which state’s law must govern the scope of the 
defense where one state’s law provides a defense to individuals based on 
                                                     
170. Hyatt II, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct 1277, 1282, 1283 (2016). 
171. The differential treatment of sister-state immunity would fail the more exacting requirements 
of the Equal Protection Clause, where the Court has found no equal protection violation in the 
application of rules of liability to a nonresident defendant when the rules apply to all other defendants. 
See, e.g., Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (considering rule of liability applicable to all similarly 
situated defendants at a time when sovereigns were immune to liability). 
172. See supra notes 102, 125 and accompanying text (discussing Nevada interests served by 
disregarding California defense). 
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their conduct under the circumstances but another does not—or where the 
states differ in extending immunity to agencies and political subdivisions. 
To be sure, Hall held that California courts were free to disregard 
Nevada’s claim of complete immunity, but that case considered only the 
argument that Nevada was absolutely immune in sister states.173 Finding 
no constitutional authority for absolute immunity, the Court left standing 
the judgment against Nevada. Hall did not address the different issue that 
rises in the wake of Hyatt II: whether a failure to extend sister states the 
limits on liability available to the forum’s sovereign will constitute an 
unconstitutionally prohibited policy of hostility. 
On the one hand, the parity requirement responds to a concern with a 
policy of hostility, and hostility seems established by the application of a 
less favorable rule of law. On the other hand, the authority for the parity 
requirement is the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and it is difficult to see 
how an obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister state’s claimed 
immunity could support a constitutional obligation to give the sister state 
greater immunity than it enjoys under the law that is due full faith and 
credit. 
Justice Breyer’s opinion in Hyatt II does not answer the question. He 
frames the issue broadly and offers a broad answer: “[w]hether the 
Constitution permits Nevada to award damages against California 
agencies under Nevada law that are greater than it could award against 
Nevada agencies in similar circumstances. We conclude that it does 
not.”174 This passage might suggest that California could not award 
damages against Nevada that are greater than it could award against 
California. Nevertheless, the opinion’s broad language occurs in the 
context of prohibiting “special rule of law that evinces a ‘policy of 
hostility’ toward California.”175 In finding the special hostile rule, Justice 
Breyer emphasizes that the Nevada rule ignored both Nevada’s rule of 
immunity and California’s “immunity-related statutes.”176 And 
                                                     
173. See supra section II.C. 
174. Hyatt II, 136 S. Ct. at 1281. The syllabus—evidence not of the law of the case but of one 
competent reading of the holding—provides: “[t]he Constitution does not permit Nevada to apply a 
rule of Nevada law that awards damages against California that are greater than it could award 
against Nevada in similar circumstances.” Id. at 1278 (emphasis added). 
175. Id. at 1281 (quoting Hyatt I, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003)). 
176. Id. In finding the full faith and credit violation, Justice Breyer ultimately relied on Nevada’s 
failure to accord California the benefits of the Nevada statute: “Nevada has not applied the principles 
of Nevada law ordinarily applicable to suits against Nevada’s own agencies. Rather it has applied a 
special rule of law applicable only in lawsuits against its sister States, such as California.” Id. But he 
immediately added, “[w]ith respect to damages awards greater than $50,000, the ordinary principles 
of Nevada law do not ‘conflic[t]’ with California law, for both laws would grant immunity.” Id. at 
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California, in awarding higher damages against Nevada, would not be 
employing a “special rule”; it would be applying Nevada law. 
In discussing the full faith and credit due to statutes as public acts,177 
Justice Breyer suggests that the source of the constitutional violation lay 
in Nevada’s disregard of a statute. In fact, the California statutes merely 
codified the residual sovereign immunity that was not waived under 
California law. Because California waived no immunity under the 
circumstances, Justice Breyer did not consider whether, in a case of a 
limited waiver, such a waiver would affect limits of recovery only in the 
state’s own courts, and not prevent the state from raising the defense in 
litigation in sister states. 
If the Court’s goal is to require that forum sovereigns get as much legal 
benefit as the home-state sovereign, then Nevada should have a viable 
defense under California sovereign immunity law in California courts. 
Such an aggressive application of Hyatt II would obviate the need to 
overrule Hall, because sister states would never have more liability than 
they retain under their home state law. Hall’s chief lingering effect would 
be that states would not be completely immune, and sister-state tribunals 
could assess liability consistent with the rule of parity. 
Nevertheless, an application of the parity doctrine that requires state 
courts to give sister states greater immunity than the sister states have at 
home has no legal authority—other than the general prohibition of 
hostility to sister-state laws announced in Hyatt II. It would not be 
consistent with the decisions relied on by Hyatt II.178 And requiring 
greater immunity for sister states rests on the idea that the state can create 
a cause of action in its own courts but limit claims against itself in sister 
states, an argument the Court has rejected in other contexts.179 
                                                     
1282. 
177. Id. 
178. The expansive application of Hyatt II would require the forum state to give the sister state the 
benefit of the lower liability of either forum or home state immunity. This would prevent the 
application of the sister-state law if it were higher than forum law. Hughes and Broderick prohibited 
the forum States from applying forum law based on a hostility to sister-state law, with the result that 
the forums applied sister-state law.  
179. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (holding full faith and credit does not 
prevent state from applying its own longer statute of limitations to claim created under sister-state 
law even though claim would be time barred under the law that created it); Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. 
Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 380 (1914) (holding Georgia was not required to respect the venue limits 
in an Alabama statute creating a cause of action and reasoning that states cannot control the 
enforcement by other states of rights they create); M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327, 
328 (1839) (same). 
Margaret G. Stewart carefully distinguished two ways of characterizing a state’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity. If the waiver is understood as a legislative effort directly to restrict the personal 
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C. Sovereign Parity Is Bad Medicine 
The Court’s approach in Hyatt II is open to criticism not just because 
the holding rests on questionable legal authority and because the scope of 
the new policy remains uncertain. The parity requirement is objectionable 
because it reaches bad results in practice, failing to shield a sister state for 
sovereign acts that occur solely within its borders while also failing to 
protect a forum state’s regulatory authority over out-of-state actors that 
cause injuries within the forum state. The parity limits and thus threatens 
the sovereign autonomy of states that Justice Breyer hoped to restore. 
1. Parity Under-Protects a State Engaging in Sovereign Functions 
Within Its Own Territory 
Parity provides an insufficient measure of protection when a state is 
sued in another state for damages resulting for sovereign functions 
performed within its own territory. Consider the case where a California 
state police officer shoots a suspect or injures a person while transporting 
him to the hospital in California. Though the police officer and the state 
may have complete defenses of sovereign immunity in California, the 
injured person might sue the state of California in a sister state that permits 
comparable claims against the forum state.180 
As a general matter, one state can apply its own law to claims arising 
outside the state so long as there is a significant contact creating state 
interests.181 But there are two reasons why sovereign immunity should be 
accorded greater respect where official state conduct occurs within the 
state’s territory. First, the Constitution has long recognized sovereign 
attributes of states under principles of international law that give exclusive 
regulatory control to the states over consequences of conduct within the 
                                                     
jurisdiction of other courts, it is ineffective. But if the waiver is regarded as a condition on litigation 
occurring only in the sovereign’s own courts, the result is less clear. Recognizing that such venue 
conditions are generally prohibited under Tennessee Coal, Iron, & Railroad Co. v. George, she 
observes that “reliance ought not to be placed automatically upon case law generated by claims arising 
between individuals.” Margaret G. Stewart, The State as an Unwilling Defendant: Reflections on 
Nevada v. Hall, 59 NEB. L. REV. 246, 267 (1980). 
180. Due process and full faith and credit require that there be some significant contact or 
significant aggregation of contacts with the forum state creating state interests. Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981). A 
significant contact supporting the application of forum law may be established where the injured 
person was a resident of the forum state at the time of the injury. See generally HOFFHEIMER, supra 
note 158, at 408 (discussing similar hypothetical). The contact would not be significant if residence 
were established after the injury. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 322 (citing John Hancock 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936)). 
181. See supra notes 81, 83, and 180. 
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territory.182 Although the principle of territoriality has been substantially 
eroded for over a century, it applies with special force to state action 
within the state’s own territory.183 
Second, a state, by shielding its agents and itself from liability, 
encourages state actors to engage in behavior in reliance on the immunity 
that promotes state interests. Unlike a common conflict of laws case 
involving a dispute between private parties where California recognizes 
no cause of action but Nevada does, the retention of sovereign immunity 
reflects politically charged decisions about what kind of activity to engage 
in as a state and about how to raise and allocate tax resources. In theory, 
the less immunity a sovereign retains, the more incentive it has to avoid 
cost-generating activity and the more taxes it must raise to pay for the 
resulting liability. Moreover, sovereign immunity does not just affect the 
determination of liability after the fact. Immunity affects the conduct of 
state actors within the state. For better or worse, the scope of sovereign 
immunity may influence whether a state university hires an orthopedic 
surgeon for its university’s football team. For better or worse, knowing 
they are absolutely immune, state agents may respond to an emergency by 
shooting or driving with less care. This is exactly the sort of conduct a 
state as a sovereign should be able to regulate free from outside 
interference.184 Moreover, the details of immunity law also result from a 
political process. For example, one state may recognize tort claims against 
state police in part to deter police misconduct; another state may bar such 
claims but more actively prosecute misfeasance and establish 
administrative review boards. 
2. Parity Overprotects Sister States when the Forum Has Genuine 
Interests in Applying Its Own Rule of Liability 
Parity leaves insufficient room for a state to apply its own law imposing 
liability against sister states even when it has powerful local policies 
served by its rule of liability. This problem is illustrated by a hypothetical 
case where a California state police officer shoots someone in Nevada. 
Assume that California retains sovereign immunity under the 
                                                     
182. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
183. Cf. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359–60 (1993) (noting that restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity provides defense in case involving torts allegedly committed by sovereign’s 
agents in sovereign’s territory); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applying 
act of state doctrine preventing legal challenge to sovereign decisions affecting internal affairs of 
foreign sovereign state). 
184. The due process and other limits on state action imposed by the Federal Constitution are not 
outside state law but are rather incorporated and become part of it. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 
(Supremacy Clause making federal law “the supreme Law of the Land” binding in federal courts). 
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circumstances. Assume further that Nevada allows full compensatory 
damages against a private defendant but caps liability at $50,000 for 
claims against the state of Nevada. Under Hyatt II, parity requires that 
Nevada cap damages at $50,000. 
Nevada has strong sovereign interests in controlling the effects of 
conduct in its territory. But its interests in controlling conduct become 
more attenuated when the conduct occurs outside the state or causes 
results outside the state. In contrast, California has strong interests in 
applying its general rule of liability to the sister state. This rule both 
provides compensation and affects conduct within the state of Nevada. 
Nevada has no local regulatory policy served by extending its 
sovereign immunity to California. Nevada’s immunity serves purely 
Nevada interests. Moreover, the particular form of Nevada’s immunity 
results from the political adjustment of local interests. Thus, the state may 
limit compensatory damages to $50,000 but provide alternative 
administrative procedures to deter misconduct. 
Requiring Nevada to apply its $50,000 cap to California requires 
Nevada to relinquish local compensatory and regulatory policies reflected 
in its law that holds California subject to all actual damages. Requiring 
the cap also gives the state of California a windfall—the full measure of 
protection available to the local sovereign—without the corresponding 
political compromises, such as administrative oversight or higher taxes 
that Nevada has accepted as a cost. 
IV. THE CASE FOR SISTER-STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
This Part reconsiders the Court’s continuing rejection (by four-four 
vote) of constitutional foundations for sister-state sovereign immunity 
unrelated to policies of hostility. It proposes a firm constitutional 
foundation for sister-state immunity. It also proposes that the 
constitutional source for the immunity derives from the structural limits 
on state juridical jurisdiction that existed in the founding era and 
continued into the twentieth century. 
The proposed approach would fully protect a state engaged in 
sovereign activity within its own state territories, deferring to the state 
with respect to what activities and agencies are covered by the defense, so 
long as the state causes no foreseeable injuries in other states.185 At the 
                                                     
185. This proposal makes no claim to novelty. It is very close to the Justice Peters position in his 
1972 opinion. See Hill, supra note 2, at 583 (critical of Hall but suggesting it was rightly decided 
because Nevada had entered California and affected that state’s interests); supra section II.B. 
While presented as a narrow exception to constitutional immunity, it does not follow that few cases 
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same time, the proposed approach would not enlarge immunity beyond its 
historical limits and would not force forum states to respect sister-state 
immunities when the sister states engage in activities beyond their 
territorial limits. 
This Part will advance historical support for a constitutional foundation 
for a territorially based approach to sister-state sovereign immunity that 
stops at the state’s borders. It will argue that the limited exception respects 
traditional limits on state power over sister states while accommodating a 
state’s legitimate regulatory control over events within their states. It will 
examine the most common alternative proposed for an exception—one 
that focuses on the sovereign character of the sister state’s conduct. And 
it will consider the promising alternative approach proposed by Judge 
Rogers for rooting sister-state immunity in international law. Finally, it 
will show how the proposed approach would apply to three types of cases. 
A. Territorial Limitations Embedded in the Structural Operation of 
State Judicial Systems in the Founding Era 
Both sides in the controversy over sister-state sovereign immunity 
accept the proposition that the framers assumed that states could not be 
sued in sister-state courts. Debate focused instead on whether this 
immunity stemmed from (or should now be located) in the law of the 
forum states or whether it was imposed by the federal Constitution.186 All 
seem to agree that, because the immunity defense was so deeply and 
widely accepted, no state felt the need to articulate the immunity in a 
provision of federal law, thus leaving open the question of the effect of 
the federal practice of leaving unarticulated powers to the states.187 
                                                     
will satisfy the exception. Many cases litigated in sister-state courts involve some conduct or effect 
occurring outside the territory of the defendant state. The presence of such a feature may be necessary 
to qualify for personal jurisdiction. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 412 (1979) (long arm service 
based on operation of motor vehicle in state). 
186. Gary J. Simson, The Role of History in Constitutional Interpretation: A Case Study, 70 
CORNELL L. REV. 253 (1985) (arguing Hall was inattentive to history, asserting that founder era jurists 
viewed states as immune in sister states, but failing to identify concrete legal sources that the Court 
neglected that could provide a constitutional basis for the immunity). 
187. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The reservation of rights by the people has not been raised in 
discussions of state immunity. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution of 
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). See 
generally Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. 
REV. 343, 345 (1981) (observing the Ninth Amendment lies in such disrepute that no majority applies 
it to anything). 
There is considerable evidence that some framer era jurists viewed sovereign immunity with deep 
skepticism and welcomed challenges to it. This is clearest in Justice Wilson’s opinion in Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 459 (1793) (Wilson, J.). Wilson rejected the structural argument that the king 
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Despite the assumption that the framers embraced sister-state sovereign 
immunity on theoretical or ideological grounds, there were two more 
immediate pragmatic reasons why framers did not envisage states 
becoming embroiled in litigation in sister-state courts—and why they did 
not imagine the need for federal limits on such litigation.188 
First and most important was the absence of any procedural mechanism 
for subjecting one state to the personal jurisdiction of another state’s 
courts. The problem was not that courts lacked the ability to fashion a writ 
sufficient in form to bind a state as a defendant.189 Rather the problem was 
                                                     
enjoyed sovereign immunity because no court was superior to the king. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 458 
(questioning theory that law issued from superior authority and proposing that the Constitution 
embraced “another principle, very different in its nature and operations . . . [namely, that] laws 
derived from the pure [s]ource of equality and justice [and] must be founded on the CONSENT of 
tho[s]e who[s]e obedience they require”). Wilson also questioned Blackstone’s history. Id. at 460. 
From a general consideration of sovereign immunity, Justice Wilson found that Georgia was subject 
to federal jurisdiction. Though the Eleventh Amendment altered the result of Chisholm, it did not 
reject its reasoning: “the states were concerned with finance—not legal theory.” George W. Pugh, 
Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476, 485 (1953). See 
generally HAROLD J. LASKI, RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE IN ENGLAND, THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (1921) (arguing that Holmes’s structural argument for 
sovereign immunity was later development and “[n]o such certainty, indeed existed in the early days 
of the Republic; and Chief Justice Jay and Mr. Justice Wilson regarded the immunity of the state from 
suit as the typical doctrine of autocratic government”); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987) (arguing state immunity with respect to federal claims 
is incompatible with the constitutional tradition of rooting sovereignty in the people); Randy E. 
Barnett, The People or the State? Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1729, 1733–34 (2007) (same). See also Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE 
L.J. 1, 4 (1924) (contending immunity of king was originally personal). Justice Peters was thus writing 
in a longstanding tradition with roots in the founding era when he observed that the defense of 
sovereign immunity was “suspect.” Hall v. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Cal. 1972). 
188. Rebecca Block offers a different explanation for the lack of concern with suits against states 
in state courts. She argues that states did not foresee a need for an express guarantee for immunity in 
sister state courts “because they did not foresee the technological advances which resulted in a mobile 
society with concomitantly complex interstate commerce.” Block, supra note 61, at 191. This is less 
persuasive because states engaged in commercial activity from an early date and recognized their 
potential liability for such activity. Indeed, the claim in Chisholm v. Georgia stemmed from a contract 
for sale of goods between a South Carolina citizen and the state of Georgia. See Caleb Nelson, 
Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (2002) 
(discussing facts of case). 
189. Nelson contends that the absence of technically sufficient process prevented states from being 
joined in civil actions in federal or state court without their consent. Nelson, supra note 188, at 1559. 
Nelson relies heavily on the English common-law requirement that a defendant enter an appearance 
as a prerequisite for entry of judgment. Id. There are two objections to his theory. First, American 
jurists were certainly familiar with the old common-law requirements, but neither federal nor state 
courts embraced them. Id. The process issued in Chisholm v. Georgia conclusively demonstrates the 
divergence of U.S. practice from the common law. In Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), the Supreme 
Court, sitting as a trial court, granted the order requested: “[i]t is Ordered, that the Plaintiff in this 
cause do file his declaration on or before the first day of March next. Ordered that certified copies of 
the said declaration be served on the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Georgia, on or 
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that effective judicial process over nonresidents was strictly limited to the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court that issued it.190 Even if states had the 
attributes of legal persons that made them subject to suit, no process 
existed—or would have been conceivable in that age—for subjecting the 
state to jurisdiction in personam.191 At best, state ownership interests 
                                                     
before the first day of June next. Ordered that, unless the said State shall either in due form appear, 
or show cause to the contrary in this Court, by the first day of next Term, judgment by default shall 
be entered against the said State.” Id. at 479. Whether classified as an original praecipe form original 
writ or as a summons, the order plainly compelled obedience. And a majority assumed the Court was 
authorized to issue such an order, if not by its inherent authority as a supreme court, then under the 
All Writs Act, Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
Second, Justices regarded the more onerous common law service procedures as inapplicable in U.S. 
practice. Justice Story referred specifically to the common-law requirement of an appearance, but he 
recognized that American courts did not impose a similar requirement. See Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. 
Cas. 609, 612–23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134). 
190. Prior to the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts had the power to issue an order to the state 
of Georgia because Georgia lies within their territorial jurisdiction, and an officer of the court could 
serve process on the governor and attorney general within the United States. The possibility of such 
jurisdiction for federal courts and the corresponding lack of process for sister-state courts explains 
why the issue of state immunity arose exclusively in federal litigation and why the Eleventh 
Amendment did not address sister-state immunity in state court. 
For a discussion of the personal jurisdiction limits on actions against sister states, see Ann 
Woolhandler, Interstate Sovereign Immunity, 2006 S. CT. REV. 249, 282–85. Woolhandler concludes 
that the absence of private lawsuits against sister states was not due “solely” to restraints on personal 
jurisdiction. Id. at 285. But her evidence supporting the supposed dissociation of jurisdiction and 
immunity is either case law postdating International Shoe, or cases commenced as actions quasi in 
rem, where the proceedings were commenced by attachment, but the liability was for damages for an 
injury. The latter authority does not distinguish the defense on the merits from the absence of 
territorial jurisdiction. See id. at 284 n.124 (discussing Tappan v. W. & Atl. R.R., 71 Tenn. 106, 113 
(1879) (dismissing private civil action on notes completely unrelated to bonds issued by Georgia 
when action was commenced by attaching real property owned by Georgia in Tennessee with court 
opining: “[n]o State can be sued in its own courts, except by its consent, and certainly can not be 
impleaded in a foreign State, against its consent. These are axiomatic principles of jurisprudence, 
about which there can be no doubt or debate”)). 
191. Smith observes that theories of sovereignty were coextensive with Pennoyer’s vision of 
personal jurisdiction. Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1, 84 (2003). But he does not attribute any further constitutional significance to this 
limitation. When the Court later grounded jurisdictional limits on the Due Process Clause, it relied on 
earlier authority that linked jurisdiction with sovereignty. Justice Field wrote, “no State can exercise 
direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.” Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (emphasis added). This principle was a corollary of the proposition that “[e]very 
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.” 
Id. For both propositions, Justice Field cited and paraphrased Justice Story’s treatise where the maxim 
lists the territorial restriction on sovereignty first: “every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty 
and jurisdiction within its own territory.” JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND 
ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, AND JUDGMENTS ch. 2 § 18, at 19 
(Boston, Hillard, Gray, & Co. 1834) (emphasis added). For the chronology of the territorial theory, 
see infra note 194. 
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might be attached in actions in rem in the same way that foreign sovereign 
rights were first brought to federal courts in libels in admiralty.192 By the 
first third of the nineteenth century, de facto territorial limits on judicial 
power were recognized as limitations of their sovereignty, rooted either in 
the law of nations (international law), general law,193 or natural law.194 
In 1850, D’Arcy v. Ketchum195 relied on the understanding of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause in 1790 to hold that full faith and credit did not 
require states to enforce a sister-state judgment entered against a 
nonresident who was not served within its territory.196 The Court’s 
opinion was grounded not on unique federal policies served by the Clause 
but on the inherent limitations of sovereign power. The opinion thus 
referred to settled international practice under which “[such a] proceeding 
is deemed an illegitimate assumption of power, and resisted as mere 
abuse.”197 
                                                     
192. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The action was commenced 
by a libel of a vessel where the United States clearly obtained effective jurisdiction in rem over 
property within its territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court adopted sovereign immunity as a 
matter of comity under international law. 
193. For a sustained argument that territorial limits on personal jurisdiction were—and are—rooted 
in the general or unwritten law, see Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right: Jurisdiction and General 
Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). 
194. Treatises by Jabez Henry (1823) and William Story (1834) popularized and paraphrased the 
territorial maxims found in writings of Dutch legal scholar Ulrich Huber (1635–1694)—though Story 
appears to be the first to actually cite Huber. Story discussed territorial limits in his chapter entitled 
“General Maxims of International Jurisprudence,” but he might have regarded their origin as natural 
law rather than the law of nations (international law) because they were a function of the de facto 
power of states. See generally STORY, supra note 191, at 19 n.1 (citing Ulricus Huberus, De Conflictu 
Legum, in 1 PRAELECTIONES JURIS CIVILIS tit. 3, § 2.); JABEZ HENRY, On Personal and Real Statutes 
pt. 1, ch. 1, at 1–2, in THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF DEMERARA IN THE CASE OF ODWIN V. 
FORBES ON THE PLEA OF THE ENGLISH CERTIFICATE OF BANKRUPTCY IN BAR, IN A FOREIGN 
JURISDICTION, TO THE SUIT OF A FOREIGN CREDITOR, AS CONFIRMED IN APPEAL, WITH THE 
AUTHORITIES, AND FOREIGN AND ENGLISH CASES (London, S. Sweet 1823). 
Story published his treatise in the 1830s. But the territorial theory of sovereignty was grounded on 
preexisting geographical limits on judicial jurisdiction for which there was judicial authority. See 
STORY, supra note 191, at § 539, at 450–51 (“[N]o sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own 
territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of 
authority of this sort, beyond this limit, is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or 
property in any other tribunals.” (citing Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (C.C.D. Mass. 
May 1828) (Story, Cir. J.))). Story’s treatise quoted verbatim (without quotation marks) from the 
Justice’s own opinion in the cited case—adding only a single word (“own”) not found in the opinion. 
Both his treatise and opinion cited Lord Ellenborough’s discussion in Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 
(KB 1808) (propounding view that service by publication in Tobago would not yield valid judgment 
against nonresident not present in Tobago at time of publication).  
195.  52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).  
196. Id. at 174.  
197. Id. Territorial limits on sovereign power and D’Arcy in particular provided key authority for 
the Court’s later decision imposing due process limits on personal jurisdiction. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
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Second, sovereign liability was narrowly construed and did not extend 
to the misconduct of state agents and agencies. “The king can do no 
wrong” was understood not solely as secondary support for the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, as Justice Stevens maintained,198 but also as a 
means of restricting the doctrine to the person of the king, excluding his 
counselors.199 The doctrine permitted liability on agents on the theory that 
wrongful conduct was beyond the scope of their agency.200 
Not only was it conceivable that a state might impose liability on a 
sovereign’s agents, as late as 1889, one state sought to impose such 
liability on a federal marshal who killed a man who assaulted a sitting 
Justice of the Supreme Court.201 And much of the judicial attention to the 
scope of sovereign immunity addressed the issue of when suits against 
officers were really suits against states.202 Litigation against states for acts 
                                                     
U.S. 714, 729–30 (1877) (citing and discussing case). The Court’s subsequent retreat from Pennoyer’s 
territorialism may in turn explain the universal neglect of pre-Pennoyer cases acknowledging 
territorial restrictions on sovereign authority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and international 
law. 
198. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979). 
199. The future abolitionist senator Charles Sumner recorded the contemporary understanding in 
an annotation to the maxim (“The king can do no wrong.”) in his personal copy of JOHN LOUIS DE 
LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 64 (new 
ed., London, J. Hatchard & Son, 1834): “[t]his maxim really means that if any wrong results from the 
king’s measures[,] the blame is not to rest on his shoulders but those of his ministers who warn and 
advise him in all matters. This is what the maxims means; no more and no less.” I think it probable 
that Sumner studied this text the year after it appeared, the year he graduated from Harvard Law 
School. A copy of the book with a manuscript annotation is in the possession of the author. 
Sumner provides a narrower explanation than Blackstone, who wrote that the maxim means 
“only . . . that in the first place, whatever may be amiss in the conduct of public affairs is not 
chargeable personally on the king; nor is he, but his ministers, accountable for it to the people: and, 
secondly, that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury . . . .” 3 W. BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *254–55 (T. Cooley 3d ed. 1884). 
The point is not whether eighteenth and nineteenth century understandings were historically 
accurate. See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW 515–17 (S.F.C. Milsom ed., 2d ed. 1968) (original ed. 1898) (discussing credible 
evidence of early common law traditions that king was subject to common law); Herbert Barry, The 
King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349, 352 (1925) (providing examples of conflicting 
understandings of the maxim). The point is that, consistent with these understandings, English courts 
permitted suit against government officials and employees who committed wrongs on the theory that 
the king, unable to commit a wrong, did not authorize their conduct. See generally Pugh, supra note 
187, 479–80. 
200. Amar advances a variation of this argument in proposing limits to state immunity in federal 
court for violations of federal law. Cf. Amar, supra note 187, at 1426 (“[W]henever a government 
entity transgresses the limits of its delegation [of authority by the people] by acting ultra vires, it 
ceases to act in the name of the sovereign, and surrenders any derivative ‘sovereign’ immunity it 
might otherwise possess.”). 
201. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 3 (1890). 
202. See, e.g., Borchard, supra note 187, at 13–22 (discussing issues in cases). 
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caused by their employees in other states became possible in the late 
twentieth century only after forum states became habituated both to long-
arm jurisdiction and to the vicarious liability of states for the acts of their 
employees.203 
Sister-state liability was so firmly barred by structural limits on the 
process of state tribunals that lawsuits in sister-state courts based on 
personal jurisdiction lay well beyond the imagination—and fears—of 
founder-era jurists. Reflecting those structural limits, after the Eleventh 
Amendment, lawsuits against states as sovereigns would arise with 
respect to the sovereign’s conduct within its own territorial borders. And 
state courts would accord the forum sovereign whatever form of the 
defense existed under local law. In contrast, where property could be 
attached beyond its borders, sovereign immunity was extended as a matter 
of comity under international law.204 
Justice Stevens in Hall failed to identify the procedural source of 
structural limits on sister-state liability during the founding era and 
likewise failed to consider the significance of the fact that the continuing 
commitment to such procedural limits effectively shielded states from 
liability in other state courts. The historic limits on the reach of judicial 
process become constitutionally relevant for two reasons. First, they were 
quickly generalized into widely accepted limitations on sovereign 
power.205 Second, the procedural limits endured into the twentieth 
century. While the duration of the practice alone does not confer 
constitutional authority, it is relevant.206 
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the duration of the practices 
reveals more deeply held civic understandings about the respective 
authority of states. The position of forty-five state attorneys general that 
Hall should be overruled provides convincing evidence that a 
constitutional mandate to respect sister-state immunity is popular with 
state executives.207 While state courts today reach out-of-state defendants, 
                                                     
203. Hall was the first to reach the Court. It involved long-arm jurisdiction under California’s 
nonresident motorist statute. 440 U.S. at 412. Earlier cases were commenced by proceedings in rem. 
See supra notes 27, 45 (discussing Paulus). 
204. See supra note 192 (discussing Schooner Exchange). 
205. See supra note 191, 194 (discussing Story). 
206. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 633 (1990) (Brennan, J.) (“Tradition, though alone 
not dispositive, is of course relevant to the question whether the rule of transient jurisdiction is 
consistent with due process.” (emphasis in original)). 
207. See generally Michael Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of 
Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 389–405 (2012) (arguing Court should give significance 
to collective attorney general briefs only under limited circumstances). Solimine points out that the 
state attorneys general in most states are elected and operate independently of the governors. Id. at 
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including states themselves that cause injuries in their territories or to 
persons under their protection, civic expectations still may associate a 
sovereign’s authority with its territorial limits. 
In short, the Court was wrong in Hall to suppose that sister-state 
immunity was grounded exclusively in comity. In doing so, it missed the 
opportunity to recognize an exception for immunity targeted narrowly at 
those cases that emerged after traditional limits on state judicial power 
were relaxed and forum states began to exercise jurisdiction in personam 
over sister states based on injuries they caused through their agents in the 
forum’s territory. 
B. International Law as a Source of Sister-State Immunity 
In one of the most persuasive critiques of Hall’s rejection of 
constitutional sources for sister-state immunity, Judge John M. Rogers 
makes a persuasive case that such immunity is grounded in legal rules 
beyond the comity of the forum tribunal. He proposes that the federal 
system, including the states, embrace a shared commitment to principles 
of international law and that the Supreme Court has appellate authority to 
impose on states the obligation to respect sister-state immunity that 
derives from principles of international law.208 
There are hurdles, however, to applying international principles to 
sister-state immunity. First, the Supreme Court has avoided applying 
concepts from international law to questions of state sovereignty.209 
                                                     
384–85. Even assuming the attorney generals speak with the authority of the state executives, it is 
debatable whether state executives in the posture of defending lawsuits seeking money damages 
impartially represent the full interest of the state. Those same states may have expressed an interest 
in holding other states liable through state legislation and judicial decisions. 
208. Rogers, supra note 11, at 466–67, 469–70. Judge Rogers does not argue that immunity is 
required under international law. 
The elegance of his argument consists in the fact that the procedural opportunity for Supreme Court 
review gives the Court authority by common law to adopt principles from international law and make 
them binding on states. See also Hill, supra note 2, at 583; Martiniak, supra note 24, at 1166 
(suggesting federal courts should apply same federal common law that the Supreme Court would 
apply in litigation between two interested states). A similar proposal to ground limits on sister-state 
immunity in the Court’s power to develop common law rule governing interstate relations is advanced 
in an early critique of Hyatt II. See Jonathan M. Gutoff, Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt: 
A Split Court, Full Faith and Credit, and Federal Common Law, 22 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
248, 259–60 (2017). 
Under international law, the states of the union lack the essential attributes to be treated as foreign 
sovereigns. Nor do states qualify as foreign states for purposes of the FSIA. Smith, supra note 177, 
at 92. This is not an obstacle to Judge Rogers’s argument, because he urges the adoption of 
international law limits as a matter of federal common law. 
209. Smith observes, “[i]t is clear from the Court’s decision in Hall . . . that it did not view the 
states as sovereigns within the meaning of the law of nations.” Id. at 87. He points out that the Supreme 
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Second, it is not obvious why the governing law must be uniform.210 
States are currently applying their own separate visions of the appropriate 
deference due to sister-state immunity and reaching different 
conclusions.211 
Third, it is not clear what sources should guide courts when 
international law has departed from norms during the founding era that 
regulated relations between sovereigns.212 As Judge Rogers emphasizes, 
the scope of international sovereign immunity has evolved: as sovereign 
states expanded the range of their activity in the twentieth century, the 
international law on sovereign immunity retreated from an absolute 
defense to a restrictive defense that allowed for exceptions. Under this 
approach, immunity was available when foreign states engaged in public 
activities (acta jure imperii) but not when they engaged in commercial 
activities (acta jure gestionis).213 The federal Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) codifies the restrictive theory of immunity: 
foreign states are immune to jurisdiction of state and federal courts unless 
the Act provides an exception.214 Exceptions include acts causing personal 
                                                     
Court has been careful to locate the source of sovereign immunity in English common law rather than 
international law, id. at 74, 74 n.313 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715–16 (1999)), and has 
cited Hall itself for that proposition. See id. at 88 n.362 (considering and rejecting possible reading 
of Hall as locating state immunity in law of nations). 
210. Even accepting Judge Rogers’s argument that the Supreme Court has the authority to review 
state decisions and to apply international law principles, it is not self-evident that the Court should do 
so or should promulgate a uniform law. Rather the Court could leave to each state the sovereign task 
of construing the applicable (international) law—a process arguably identical to what it has done in 
leaving the issue to state courts as a matter of comity. Smith contends this was the plan of the 
Constitution: “the Constitution envisions a similar equality of right among the several states [as 
between foreign powers that are not subject to supervisory review by a superior court].” Id. at 88. 
211. Compare, e.g., Hall v. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Cal. 1972) (discussed, supra notes 
31–33) (refusing to extend comity to sister state defense), with Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 544 
N.E.2d 283, 287–88 (Ill. 1989) (honoring sister-state’s reservation of sovereign immunity), and 
Simmons v. Montana, 670 P.2d 1372 (Mont. 1983) (recognizing sister-state defenses on grounds of 
comity even though the Constitution does not require comity). 
212. Judge Rogers makes a strong case for the Court’s authority to adopt evolving standards, but 
the Court has not shown any interest in doing so. If it did, it would become debatable whether the 
1976 federal codification of international law standards in the FSIA provides the appropriate source. 
If states are bound by principles of international law under the Constitution, it could be argued that 
limits of their liability should be determined at the time of their establishment as sovereigns—and no 
later than the time when they formed an indissoluble union with sister states. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999) (fixing sovereign immunity as attribute of state sovereignty in the founding era) 
(discussed supra note 66). 
213. Rogers, supra note 11, at 472–73. 
214. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012). The idea that the FSIA codifies international law, e.g., Rogers, supra 
note 11, at 472–73, is true only as a generalization. The statutory history indicates that Congress meant 
to provide immunities that were available to the United States in foreign courts, but Congress also 
borrowed procedures and defenses from the Federal Torts Claim Act, and it provided policy 
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injury, death, or property damages in the United States215 and claims 
stemming from some commercial activity in or affecting the U.S.216 
The Act does not require anything like formal parity or reciprocity. It 
does not exempt foreign countries because their courts fail to extend 
immunity to the United States. Nor does it automatically entitle foreign 
countries to all the defenses that would be available to either the United 
States or to states as defendants. On the contrary, it provides that when 
sovereign immunity is eliminated due to an exception, the foreign state 
becomes liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances.”217 
There can be practical difficulties with fitting private claims against 
sister states into the FSIA. The Act would be easy to apply to the car 
accident in Hall. Thus, Judge Rogers, while maintaining Hall was wrong 
to reject a constitutional basis for sister-state immunity, concluded that the 
case was rightly decided because causing a personal injury in California 
fell under an exception to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.218 In contrast, applying the Act to the claims in Hyatt 
becomes more difficult. Most of the intentional torts would be barred,219 
                                                     
exceptions (such as exceptions for state sponsors of terrorism) that had no authority and may even be 
contrary to international law. Email from Charles H. Brower II, Professor of Law, Wayne State Univ. 
Law School, to Michael H. Hoffheimer, Professor of Law, The Univ. of Miss. School of Law (Dec. 
10, 2016) (on file with author). 
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(5)(a)(5). 
216. Id. Commercial activity may provide an exception to immunity in three situations: where the 
claim is based on the foreign country’s commercial activity in the U.S.; where the claim is based on 
the foreign country’s act in the U.S. in connection with commercial activity outside the U.S.; and 
where the claim is based on an act by the foreign country outside the U.S. that causes a direct effect 
in the U.S. Id. See generally Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (emphasis added). 
The FSIA controls the scope of sovereign immunity extended to foreign states by U.S. courts, 
including state courts. In litigation involving sister states, however, state courts have not followed the 
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity. 
Moreover, in cases under its legislative jurisdiction, the federal system waives immunity only for 
claims arising in the U.S., retaining immunity for claims arising in foreign states. The FSIA expresses 
Congress’s understanding of the limits of sovereign immunity in U.S. courts only with respect to 
foreign nation states. Congress has not attempted to legislate the limits of state sovereign immunity. 
In partially waiving sovereign immunity with respect to claims against the federal government, 
Congress provides that such claims must arise within the territorial limits of the U.S. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b) (Federal Torts Claim Act partially waiving immunity); id. § 2680(k) (providing Federal 
Tort Claims Act “shall not apply to . . . any claim arising in a foreign country”). See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that place where claim arises is place of injury). 
218. Rogers, supra note 11, at 472–73. 
219. There is a potential issue as to whether Hyatt suffered any personal injury as required for the 
FSIA. The applicable state law did not require proof of such injury, but the plaintiff did produce 
sufficient objectively verifiable evidence of extreme emotional distress to satisfy state law. Franchise 
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but the Act does not address personal injury resulting from intentional 
infliction of extreme emotional distress; nor does it provide the legal 
standard to determine whether an employee’s acts are within the scope of 
agency and thus attributable to the state.220 
The immunity provided by international law, designed to alleviate 
potential conflicts between sovereigns, may be less appropriate in a case 
where sister states have identifiable governmental interests and where 
other provisions of the Constitution reduce the risk of state-to-state 
conflict. In Hyatt, for example, the state of California retains complete 
immunity for intentional torts like intentional infliction of extreme 
emotional distress and interference with privacy. Such immunity removes 
disincentives that may discourage California state agencies from 
aggressively investigating tax liability. Conversely, to permit sister states 
to disregard such immunity could encourage the establishment of “tax 
asylums” for wealthy scofflaws who flee to them after flouting local laws. 
In contrast, Nevada, by recognizing claims for intentional torts, seeks 
to protect individuals from injurious conduct. In refusing to extend 
immunity to sister states for such claims, Nevada regards their legitimate 
administration of government functions to require no such extensive 
protection. Applying the FSIA to bar the claim would privilege 
California’s interests and deprive Nevada of its own sovereign authority 
to regulate conduct and the effects of conduct within the state of Nevada. 
C. Application of the Proposed Approach 
Under the proposed territorial approach, Hall was rightly decided. 
Where an agent authorized by the state of Nevada caused a personal injury 
in California, California may disregard the Nevada defense of sovereign 
immunity. Moreover, no parity should be required. It would be reasonable 
for California to subject a sister state to higher levels of liability when the 
sister state is free from alternative regulatory restraints available against 
California. 
In contrast, Hyatt was wrongly decided—but only to the extent that 
claims arose from the California agents’ activity in Nevada. To the extent 
that the plaintiff’s theory stemmed from fraudulent statements 
                                                     
Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 149 (Nev. 2014) (discussing evidence of injuries, including severe 
migraines and stomach problems). Even if he suffered a personal injury, that exception to federal 
sovereign immunity does not apply to “any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights . . . .” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(5)(B). 
220. The Act provides that the exceptions to personal-injury liability arise only when caused by the 
foreign state or by “any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his 
office or employment . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(5). 
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communicated in California or were based on biased prosecutorial 
policies implemented in California, Nevada should be required to accept 
the state of California’s sovereign immunity defense. To the extent that 
claims arose from invasions of privacy based on agents’ acts in Nevada, 
however, the state of Nevada should be free to apply Nevada law and 
impose liability against California. Again, parity should not prevent a 
higher level of liability. 
Finally, there is the hypothetical case where state A sends an agent to 
state B to negotiate financing of state bonds, and the agent causes personal 
injuries to a resident of state B while in state B.221 In such a case, state B 
should be free to apply its laws and disregard state A’s sovereign 
immunity without regard to limits on sovereign immunity enjoyed by state 
B—or the limits enjoyed by state A in its own courts. In contrast, full faith 
and credit would requires state B to recognize state A’s defense for a 
personal injury caused by its agents in state to a resident of state B. 
The proposed approach preserves the territorial limit of sovereign 
immunity as an attribute of state sovereignty. But it also allocates to forum 
states maximum regulatory control over conduct and consequences of 
conduct within their jurisdiction. The proposed approach does not, of 
course, guide states in the exercise of such regulatory control, and states 
can—and probably should—grant sister states more sovereign immunity 
than the Constitution requires. 
CONCLUSION 
In Hyatt II, an evenly divided Court fails to overrule a 1979 precedent 
that had left state courts free to disregard sister-state defenses of sovereign 
immunity. But a majority in Hyatt II finds a new parity requirement in the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause: state courts must now give a sister state at 
least as much sovereign immunity as they give their own sovereign. 
                                                     
221. Forty-one states proposed the following hypothetical as an “example of the injustice” if states 
need not give full faith and credit to sister states’ sovereign immunity. Brief of the State of West 
Virginia, supra note 50, at 4–6. 
South Dakota is in the process of obtaining financing through the issuance of bonds and, as a result 
of New York’s position as a financial center, is required to send an employee to New York. While in 
New York, said employee is involved in an automobile accident with a New York resident. The New 
York resident files an action against Sought Dakota in New York’s State Court and obtains 
jurisdiction pursuant to New York’s nonresident motorist act. Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff is 
returned at the precise time that the proceeds from South Dakota’s bond issue are deposited in New 
York banks. The Plaintiff attaches those funds in New York. 
The hypothetical was designed to illustrate unfairness due to the greater opportunities available to 
New York residents to satisfy judgments and also to demonstrate how attaching South Dakota’s assets 
would have “a dramatic effect on her ability to meet her own sovereign responsibilities.” Id. at 5 n.1. 
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This Article argues that parity is a temporary solution that is uncertain 
in its scope, inconsistent with full faith and credit principles, and 
unsupported by case law. Moreover, parity reaches the wrong result in too 
many situations. It overprotects a state that causes injuries in other states 
while it interferes with the sovereign authority of those states to regulate 
conduct and effects of conduct within their territory. 
The Court’s failure to reach agreement on the core constitutional issue 
and the problems with parity presage a return of the question of sister-
state sovereign immunity to the Court.222 This Article shows how the 
Court can recognize an alternative constitutional foundation for sister-
state sovereign immunity that does not depend on parity. It explains how 
procedures from the founding era through the twentieth century provided 
fixed territorial limits to the juridical jurisdiction of state courts. These 
limits effectively prevented a state court from disregarding a sister state’s 
defense of sovereign immunity. 
At the same time, this Article contends that the Court is right to resist 
the expansion of immunity beyond the structural limits imposed in the 
past. Accordingly, it proposes that the Constitution should command 
respect for a state’s defense of sovereign immunity as measured by that 
state’s own law but only for conduct in its own territory. States should 
remain free to disregard a sister state’s claimed immunity when the sister 
state acts beyond its territory and causes injuries in the forum state. The 
proposed approach preserves traditional, structural limits grounded on 
notions of sovereignty and it strikes the right balance between the needs 
of the interstate system and the competing claims to sovereignty of the 
defendant state and the forum state. 
 
 
                                                     
222. See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 
(2017) (“The split decision in Franchise Tax Board leaves the issue to come up again—perhaps 
soon.”); Pidot, supra note 8, at 297 (2016) (discussing doctrine developed in Hyatt II and other cases 
decided by tie vote and observing that “there is reason to believe that [the decisions] are unlikely to 
create prolonged spits of authority”). 
